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Abstract
The reactor neutrino and gallium anomalies can be tested with a 3-4 PBq (75-100 kilocurie
scale) 144Ce−144 Pr antineutrino beta-source deployed at the center or next to a large low-
background liquid scintillator detector. The antineutrino generator will be produced by the
Russian reprocessing plant PA Mayak as early as 2014, transported to Japan, and deployed
in the Kamioka Liquid Scintillator Anti-Neutrino Detector (KamLAND) as early as 2015.
KamLAND’s 13 m diameter target volume provides a suitable environment to measure the
energy and position dependence of the detected neutrino flux. A characteristic oscillation
pattern would be visible for a baseline of about 10 m or less, providing a very clean signal of
neutrino disappearance into a yet-unknown, "sterile" state. This will provide a comprehensive
test of the electron dissaperance neutrino anomalies and could lead to the discovery of a 4th
neutrino state for ∆m2new & 0.1 eV 2 and sin2(2θnew) & 0.05.
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1 Executive summary
Over the last 20 years a standard neutrino oscillation framework associated with small splittings
between the ν mass states has become well established. The three ν flavors (νe, νµ, ντ ) are
mixtures of three massive neutrinos (ν1, ν2, ν3) separated by squared mass differences of ∆m221 =
∆m2sol = 7.50
+0.19
−0.20× 10−5 eV2 and | ∆m231 |≈| ∆m232 |= ∆m2atm = 2.32+0.12−0.08× 10−3 eV2 [3]. This is
a minimal extension of the Standard Model that requires a lepton mixing matrix, similarly to the
quark sector.
Beyond this model, indications of oscillations between active and sterile νs have been observed in
LSND [4], MiniBooNE [5, 6], Gallium [7, 8, 9] and more recently by reactor experiments [10]. This
suggests the possible existence of a fourth massive ν with a mass of ∆m2 & 0.1 eV2 [11, 12, 13].
Both the reactor and Gallium anomalies result from the observation of the disappearance of MeV
energy νe and ν¯e in counting experiments. Therefore, to definitivively test the anomalies one must
not only test neutrino disappearance at short baselines, but also search for an oscillation pattern
as a function of L/Eν energy and baseline-dependent signatures. Probing ∆m2 values on the order
of 0.1 to a few eV2 implies that an oscillation search using neutrinos with energies of typical of
radioactive decays, i.e. in the few MeV range, requires a baseline of only several meters. Assuming
CP invariance, both gallium and reactor anomalies can be unambiguously tested using a neutrino
emitter placed inside or next to a large 10-meter scale liquid scintillator detector, such as Borexino,
KamLAND, SNO+, or Daya Bay. This constitutes an elegant method to probe the existence of
oscillations into a 4th neutrino by using a well-known neutrino detector.
There are two options for deploying intense ν emitters in large liquid scintillator detectors: monochro-
matic νe emitters, like 51Cr or 37Ar, or ν¯e emitters with continuous β-spectra, like 144Ce, 90Sr, 42Ar
or 106Ru. In the case of νe emitters the signature is provided by νe elastic scattering off electrons in
the liquid scintillator molecules. This signature can be mimicked by Compton scattering induced
by radioactivity or cosmogenic background, or by Solar-ν’s. The constraints of an experiment with
νe impose the use of a very high activity source & 10 MCi outside of the detector target. In the
case of ν¯e, events are detected via the inverse beta decay reaction (IBD), which provides a e+-n
delayed coincidence that offers an efficient rejection of the mentioned background. For this reason,
we focus our studies on ν¯e sources in the current proposal.
Based on the concept presented in 2011 in [1], the CeLAND collaboration intends to use an intense
144Ce source decaying into the unstable daughter 144Pr which, in turn, decays into stable 144Nd
with a Q-value of 2.996 MeV. The 144Pr decay produces antineutrinos above the 1.8 MeV threshold
for the inverse beta decay reaction. The half-life of 144Ce is 285 days, and that of its daughter
144Pr is only 17.3 minutes, so that the latter decay remains in equilibrium at all times. This thus
leaves a significant amount of time for the source production, its transportation to the detector,
and the data taking, without significant decrease in its initial activity.
The intense 144Ce−144 Pr antineutrino generator (ANG hereafter) can be produced at the Federal
State Unitary Enterprise Mayak Production Association (FSUE -Mayak- PA or simply Mayak)
reprocessing plant in Russia as early as 2014. The source will then be transported within one
month to the Kamioka mine, Japan, where the KamLAND detector is located. The CeLAND
collaboration intends to deploy a 75-100 kCi (2.78-3.73 PBq) antineutrino generator within 13m of
the KamLAND detector center, as early as 2015. The plan is to take data for at least 18 months and
to search for a fourth neutrino. If a hint of oscillation is observed, the collaboration would consider
deploying the source at the center of the detector, or procuring a second antineutrino generator to
increase the statistical power of the experiment. Such deployment strategy allows a comprehensive
test of the electron disappearance neutrino anomalies and could lead to the discovery of a 4th
neutrino state for ∆m2new & 0.1 eV 2 and sin2(2θnew) & 0.05.
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Figure 1: Schematic view of the CeLAND experiment. In the first phase of the experiment the
collaboration intends to deploy a 75-100 kCi source in the water Cherenkov outer detector of
KamLAND. This run could be followed by the deployment of the same source (approx. 50 kCi
after 6 months) at the center of the KamLAND detector for 1 year (in liquid scintillator target) in
case of detection hint of a fourth neutrino state.
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2 Physics motivations
2.1 Oscillation overview
Neutrino oscillations have been observed in solar, atmospheric, and long-baseline reactor and ac-
celerator experiments. For a detailed review, see for example [2]. The data collected so far by
these experiments are well fitted in the framework of a three-neutrino mixing approach, in which
the three known flavor neutrinos νe, νµ and ντ are unitary linear combinations of three massive
neutrinos ν1, ν2 and ν3 with squared-mass differences and mixing angles [3]:
∆m221 = ∆m
2
sol = 7.50
+0.19
−0.20 × 10−5eV 2, (1)
sin2(2θ12) = 0.857
+0.023
−0.025 (2)
| ∆m231 |≈| ∆m232 |= ∆m2atm = 2.32+0.12−0.08 × 10−3eV 2, (3)
sin2(2θ23) > 0.95 (90%C.L.), sin
2(2θ13) = 0.098± 0.013 (4)
where ∆m2jk = m
2
j −m2k and mj is the mass of the neutrino νj .
Besides this well-established picture, there are a few anomalies which could point toward short-
baseline (SBL) neutrino oscillations generated by a larger squared-mass difference: the gallium ra-
dioactive source experiment anomalies [7, 8, 9], the recently observed reactor antineutrino anomaly
[10], and the MiniBooNE [5, 6] and LSND [4] accelerator neutrino anomalies. Existence of a fourth
yet unobserved neutrino species is not ruled out by cosmological data obtained by PLANCK [14]
and WMAP [15]. In this section, we successively review these anomalies and give an up-to-date
interpretation in terms of light sterile neutrinos.
2.2 The Gallium anomaly
Man-made neutrino sources were originally proposed and designed to test solar-ν detection in the
GALLEX [16, 17, 18] and SAGE [19, 20, 21] experiments. Intense Mega Curie (MCi) 51Cr and
37Ar νe sources with precisely measured activities were placed at the center of the detectors to
count for the number of νe events, as a tool to understand the detector responses. Taking into
account the uncertainty of the cross-section of the detection process νe +71 Ga→71 Ge + e−, the
ratios R of measured to predicted 71Ge event rates reported by the experiments
RGALLEXCr1 = 0.95
+0.11
−0.12, R
GALLEX
Cr2 = 0.81
+0.10
−0.11, (5)
RSAGECr = 0.95
+0.12
−0.12, R
SAGE
Ar = 0.79
+0.09
−0.10 (6)
with an averaged ratio of
RGa = 0.86+0.05−0.05. (7)
The number of measured events is smaller than the prediction at the 2.7σ level, leading to the
so-called Gallium anomaly. Although the cross-section of the νe +71 Ga→71 Ge + e− detection
process might have been overestimated by adding the uncertain transitions from the ground state
of 71Ga to two excited states of 71Ge, the anomaly still remains at the 1.8σ level in the absence of
such transitions, with a ratio RGa = 0.90+0.05−0.05. Recently, a re-interpretation of the Gallium data
with new measurements of the Gamow-Teller strengths of the transitions from the ground state of
71Ga to the two excited states of 71Ge confirmed the anomaly at the 3σ level [9].
2.3 The reactor antineutrino anomaly
Nuclear reactors emit ν¯e through β− decay of fission products. Any reactor antineutrino spectrum
is mostly the sum of the neutrino spectra of the four fissioning nuclei (235U, 238U, 239Pu and
241Pu) weighted by their relative fission rate. Since thousands of different β branches are available
to the unstable fission products, and many of them are still unknown, neutrino spectra predictions
cannot fully rely on simulations. Neutrino spectra are then estimated by converting the precise
measurement of the total electron spectrum emitted by nuclear fuel under neutron irradiation,
using energy conservation law. However, some modeling, such as of the end point distribution of
the beta branches, still remain necessary.
In 2011, a revised calculation of the rate of ν¯e production by nuclear reactors yielded yet another
indication of the hypothetical existence of a fourth neutrino species. The new calculation relies on
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detailed knowledge of the decays of thousands of fission products listed by nuclear databases [22],
while the previous calculation used a phenomenological model based on 30 effective β-branches.
The revised rate of ν¯e production by nuclear reactors is 3.5% higher than previously thought
and was confirmed independently by another calculation [23]. This new calculation motivated
a re-analysis of 19 past reactor experiments at reactor distances < 100 m. Figure 2 shows the
ratio of measured-to-expected ν¯e count rates in each of these experiments, following the revised
calculation of the rate of ν¯e production by nuclear reactors combined with a new estimation of the
inverse β decay cross-section (driven by the neutron life-time measurement) and off-equilibrium
corrections to the reactor fuel composition. Along with these new ratios are also displayed the
results of middle-baseline experiments (L > 100 m) such as Chooz [24] or Palo Verde [25]. The
dotted line represents a “classic” three active neutrinos mixing scheme. The solid line shows a
(3+1) sterile neutrino model. A constant fit to the 19 SBL experiments’ measured-over-expected
ν¯e count rates gives a mean ratio of RR = 0.927± 0.023, corresponding to a 3σ discrepancy called
the reactor antineutrino anomaly (RAA)[10]. The SBL reactor data suggests a new ∆m2new ∼ 1 eV2
if interpreted in terms of a new SBL oscillation driven by a 4th neutrino state.
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Figure 2: Re-analysis of the past reactor antineutrino experiments, which indicates an anomaly in
the expected measured-to-predicted count rates of ν¯e at short distances. The dashed line corre-
sponds to the classic three-neutrino picture with the squared mass differences quoted above. The
solid line corresponds to a 3 active neutrinos plus one sterile neutrino (3+1) model.
2.4 Accelerator experiment anomalies
2.4.1 The LSND anomaly
The LSND experiment was designed to search for ν¯µ → ν¯e oscillations at short distances and ran
at the Los Alamos 800 MeV proton accelerator, producing ν¯µ up to 300 MeV by µ+ decay at rest
[26]. The LSND detector was placed 30 m away from the ν¯µ source and the detection process
of ν¯e relied on the inverse β decay reaction ν¯e + p+ → e+ + n. Using the data collected between
1993 and 1998, the collaboration reported evidence for ν¯µ oscillations at the 3.8σ level, with a
total excess of 87.9 ± 22.4 ± 6.0 events consistent with the ν¯e + p+ → e+ + n reaction above the
expected background [4]. In conjunction with other known neutrino limits, the LSND data suggest
that the observed neutrino oscillations occur in the 0.2-10 eV2 ∆m2 range, leading to the LSND
anomaly.
2.4.2 The MiniBooNE anomaly
MiniBooNE is an appearance experiment which ran at Fermilab between 2002 and 2012. It has
been searching for a νµ → νe and ν¯µ → ν¯e oscillation signal in the LSND L/Eν range [27]. The
experiment uses the Fermilab Booster neutrino beam, which produces νµ (ν¯µ) with energies up to 3
GeV with a 8 GeV proton beam hitting a Beryllium target. The center of the detector is 541 m away
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from the neutrino source, and the νe (ν¯e ) detection process relies on quasi-elastic charged-current
scattering on nucleons νe + C→ e− + X and ν¯e + C→ e+ + X (CCQE). In 2007, the MiniBooNE
collaboration released its first results and showed no evidence of νµ → νe oscillations for neutrino
energies above 475 MeV [28].
However in their second publication [5], the collaboration reported a sizable excess of 83.7 ± 15.1
± 19.3 electron-like events for neutrino energies between 300 MeV and 475 MeV, corresponding
to a significance of 3.4σ. In the antineutrino mode, MiniBooNE observes an excess of 24.7 ±
18.0 events in the 475 < Eν < 3000 MeV energy range, which is consistent with the antineutrino
oscillations suggested by the LSND data [6]. Finally, a combined analysis of the data collected
in the neutrino and antineutrino mode recently showed an excess of 240.3 ± 34.5 ± 52.6 events,
updating the significance to 3.8σ [29]. The combined dataset favors ∆m2 in the 0.01-1 eV2 range.
2.5 Inputs from cosmology
Cosmological data can also be used to test the sterile neutrino hypothesis because the Universe
expansion rate is sensitive to the energy density in relativistic particles during the radiation dom-
ination era [15]:
H2(t) ≈ 8piG
3
(ργ + ρν), (8)
where ργ and ρν are the photon and neutrino energy density, respectively and
ρν = Neff
7pi2
120
T4ν . (9)
Neff could be interpreted as the effective number of neutrino species. It is equal to 3.046 in
the standard model of cosmology with three generations of fermions. The extra energy density of
neutrinos with respect to Neff = 3 comes from QED and non-instantaneous decoupling effects in the
calculation of the neutrino temperature Tν . From a particle physics perspective, a sterile neutrino
that mixes with active neutrinos can increase the relativistic energy density in the early Universe
through oscillation-based thermal production, leading to a Neff > 3.046. With ργ being extremely
well determined from measurements of the cosmic microwave background (CMB) temperature,
constraints on H(t) in the early Universe can be then interpreted as bounds on ρν and hence on
Neff .
Various cosmological observables can be used to search for signatures of sterile neutrinos. Those
include the light elemental abundances from big bang nucleosynthesis (BBN), the CMB anisotropies
and the large-scale structure distribution. figure 3 summarizes the best constraints on Neff obtained
with the combination of these different cosmological observables. The recent Planck result leads to
Neff = 3.36±0.66 at 95% C.L. if no additional constraint are being used[14]. However including the
astrophysical constraints on the Hubble constant measurement this results shifts to Neff = 3.52±
0.46 at 95% C.L. Therefore Neff > 3.046 is mildly disfavored but this cosmological bound is still
model dependent. Further laboratory experiments are thus mandatory to test the hypothetical
existence of a fourth neutrino state.
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Number of Neutrino Types
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
W-9+eCMB+BAO+H0; YHe fixed
Neff
0.400± X3.840
SPT-2013
Neff
0.480± X3.620
SPT-2013+H0+BAO
Neff
0.350± X3.710
Planck+Others
Neff
0.300± X3.300
Planck+Others+H0
Neff
0.250± X3.600
Figure 3: Constraints obtained on the number of effective neutrino species Neff from different cos-
mological observables, based on WMAP 9-year data, PLANCK, SPT, BAO, and Hubble constant
astrophysical inputs. BAO corresponds to the baryon acoustic oscillations data. ACT and SPT
are the Atacama Cosmology Telescope and South Pole Telescope, respectively, which measure the
CMB damping tail. Reference [15] gives further details about these experiments.
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2.6 Global picture of SBL oscillations
Table1 summarizes the different anomalies observed so far in past neutrino oscillation experiments.
Many studies have been performed to interpret the results of the different dataset in terms of oscil-
lations into a fourth neutrino state. Figure 4 shows a comparison of the allowed 95% C.L. regions in
the sin2(2θnew)−∆m2new parameter space obtained from the separate fits of the different anomalies
presented previously in the framework of a (3+1) neutrino mixing model. A global fit to the Gal-
lium, reactor, solar, and νeC scattering data shows that two regions are preferred (in red contours),
centered around ∆m2new = 7.6 eV2, sin2(2θnew) = 0.12 and ∆m2new ' 2 eV2, sin2(2θnew) ' 0.1 [9].
The second region is preferred by Gallium and reactor data.
sin22ϑee
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Figure 4: Allowed 95% C.L. regions in the sin2(2θnew)−∆m2new plane obtained from separate fits
of Gallium, reactor, solar and νeC scattering data and from the combined fits of all data. Crosses
indicate the best-fit points. Figure taken from [9].
Experiment ν source Channel Detection Oscillation signature Significance
LSND µ decay at rest ν¯µ → ν¯e IBD Rate, energy spectrum 3.8σ
MiniBooNE pi decay in flight νµ → νe, ν¯µ → ν¯e CCQE Rate, energy spectrum 3.8σ
Gallium 51Cr,37Ar νe disappearance CCQE Rate ≈ 3.0σ
Reactor 235,238U , 239,241Pu νe disappearance IBD Rate, energy spectrum 3.0σ
Cosmology CMB, BBN, LSS, ... All - Neff ≈ 2.0σ
Table 1: Summary of the different anomalies that possibly indicate the existence of a fourth
neutrino state, along with their corresponding significances.
The results of the global fits, as well as the results of Gallium and reactor data give lower limits on
∆m2new but do not give any upper limits. Upper limits on ∆m2new, and even upper limits on the
absolute mass scale of a new sterile neutrino ms can be derived from the effects of heavy neutrino
masses on electron spectrum measured in tritium β-decay experiments such as Mainz [30, 31, 32]or
KATRIN [33], the results of neutrinoless double-β decay experiments such as KamLAND-Zen
[34, 36] or EXO [37]and cosmology. The current upper limits at the 95% C.L. on ∆m2new lie at
O(104 eV 2) assuming a normal hierarchy and come from the Mainz experiment[32]. For Majorana
neutrinos, the recent combined results of EXO and KamLAND-Zen on the effective Majorana
mass in neutrinoless double-β decay gives a more stringent constraint between 102 and 103 eV2
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[9]. Finally, cosmological data have also been used to set a 95% C.L. upper limit on the mass of
a new sterile neutrino [38], which exhibits some tension with the mixing parameters preferred by
the terrestrial experiment data:
ms < 0.45 eV. (10)
Nevertheless, the reported anomalies from the various terrestrial experiments still make a com-
pelling case for a decisive search for a fourth neutrino state in the larger mass difference region.
3 Concept of neutrino generator experiments
There are two types of ν-source suitable to search for light sterile neutrinos: monochromatic νe
emitters, such as 51Cr or 37Ar and ν¯e emitters with a continuous β-spectrum such as 144Ce, 90Sr,
42Ar or 106Ru. Both types provide pure neutrino flux with well-defined energy spectrum and
absolute rate that can be precisely measured, creating an excellent opportunity to test the fourth
neutrino hypothesis using oscillometry.
3.1 Oscillometry
The unambiguous way to address the existence of a fourth neutrino state is the determination
of the oscillation pattern in the distance-dependent flux of a pure neutrino flavor source over the
entire oscillation length. A detector-source distance similar to the expected oscillation length is
thus necessary:
L ∼ Losc[m]
2
= 1.24
Eν¯e [MeV ]
∆m2new[eV
2]
. (11)
Electron antineutrinos produced in radioactive decays have energies up to a few MeV. Assuming a
∆m2new∼1 eV2, which is preferred by the different anomalies seen in the past terrestrial neutrino
data, the optimum source-detector distance is O(1m). Therefore, large liquid-scintillator (LS)
detectors such as Borexino [39], KamLAND [40], or SNO+ [41] are able to perform precise neutrino
oscillometry since they are big enough to fully cover the spatial pattern of ν¯e oscillations into a
fourth neutrino state.
3.2 Neutrino Emitters
In the nineties, intense 51Cr (∼ 750 keV, A0 ∼ MCi) and 37Ar (814 keV, A0 ∼ 0.4 MCi) sources
were used to test the radiochemical experiments Gallex and Sage. Such radioactive neutrino
sources involve either β+-decay or electron capture. Electron captures produce mono-energetic νe’s
allowing for a determination of L/Eν by only measuring the interaction vertex position. Production
of an 37Ar source requires a large fast neutron reactor (which is not easily available), leaving 51Cr
as the best current candidate for sterile neutrino searches with νe sources. 51Cr has a half-life
of 27.7 days. It decays 90.1% of the time to the 51V ground state and emits a 751 keV νe while
9.9% of the time it decays to the first excited state of 51V and emits a 413 keV νe followed by a
320 keV γ. The large scale production of 51Cr has been possible thanks to the relatively high 50Cr
neutron capture cross-section (∼ 17.9 barns). Natural chromium is primarily composed of 53Cr
(9.5%), 52Cr (83.8%) and 50Cr (4.35%). The 53Cr and 50Cr isotopes have similar neutron capture
cross-section. Under the irradiation of natural chromium, 53Cr absorbs 2.5 neutrons every time a
neutron is captured on 50Cr, thus reducing the 51Cr yield. Enrichment of natural chromium with
50Cr is therefore necessary in order to produce a 51Cr source with an activity of several MCi. Such
enrichment is favorable for manufacturing a compact target, which is necessary for sterile neutrino
searches. The material used by the Gallex experiment was enriched to 38.6% in 50Cr while the
Sage target was enriched to 92%. Because many isotopes have high neutron capture cross-sections,
great care must be taken during the production and handling of the chromium rods in order to
avoid high-energy gamma ray contamination from chemical impurities.
In a radiochemical experiment, the interactions of 51Cr and 37Ar neutrinos produce 71Ge atoms
via the 71Ga(νe,e−)71Ge reaction. The 71Ge atoms are chemically extracted from the detector
and converted to GeH4. Ge atoms are then placed in proportional counters and their number is
determined by counting the Auger electrons released in the transition back to 71Ga, which occurs
with a half-life of 11.4 days.
In liquid scintillator experiments, the νe signature is provided by νe elastic scattering off electrons
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(ES) of the molecules. The cross section is σ(Eν) ∼ 0.96×10−44×Eν cm2, where Eν is the neutrino
energy in MeV. This signature can be mimicked by Compton scatterings induced by radioactive
and cosmogenic backgrounds, or by solar-ν interactions. An experiment running with a νe source
then imposes the use of a very high activity source (5-10 MCi) to provide an interaction rate within
the detector that will exceed the rate from solar ν, and to compensate the lack of solid angle due
to the positioning of a source outside the detector (since the ES does not provide any specific
signature of νe interaction).
3.3 Antineutrino Emitters
Antineutrino sources are non-monochromatic ν¯e emitters decaying through β−-decay. ν¯e are de-
tected through the inverse beta decay (IBD) reaction ν¯e + p → e+ + n. The IBD cross-section
is σ(Ee) ∼ 0.96 10−43 × peEe cm2, where pe and Ee are the momentum and energy (in MeV) of
the detected e+, neglecting neutron recoil, weak magnetism effects, and radiative second order
corrections. The IBD cross-section is an order of magnitude higher than the neutrino scattering
off electron cross-section at 1 MeV.
The ν¯e interaction signature is the time and space coincidence of two energy depositions in the liquid
scintillator. The first energy deposition consists of e+ kinetic energy deposition closely followed by
the energy deposition of two 511 keV γ-rays from e+ annihilation with an electron of the medium.
It is called the prompt event, releasing a total visible energy of Ee= Eν-(mn-mp) MeV. The second
energy deposition originates from the neutron capture on a free proton, with an averaged capture
time of the order of a few hundreds µs, which releases a 2.2 MeV deexcitation γ-ray. This is called
the delayed event. The time coincidence between these two energy depositions suppresses any
non-source backgrounds to a negligible level.
The background free IBD signature plus the relatively high IBD cross-section allow the source
activity to be at the (tens of) kCi scale for sterile neutrino searches. A suitable ν¯e source must
have a Qβ greater than 1.8 MeV to exceed the IBD energy threshold and a long enough lifetime
(&1 month) not to be limited by production and transportation time to the detector. Fulfillment
of these two requirements is impossible for a single nuclei, since Qβ is anti-correlated with lifetime.
We then looked for pairs of nuclei involving a long-lived low-Q nucleus decaying to a short-lived
high-Q nucleus. Since the first isotope, the parent, has a much longer lifetime than its daughter,
both nuclei are in equilibrium and the activity is driven by the parent. ν¯e emitted by the father
has not enough energy to undergo an IBD, while ν¯e in the tail of the daughter spectrum can:
A
ZX1
τ1/2∼year−−−−−−−−→
Qβ∼100 keV
A
Z+1X2
τ1/2∼hour−−−−−−−−→
Qβ>1.8 MeV
A
Z+2X3 (12)
Four pairs fulfilling the above mentioned requirements have been identified in the nuclear databases
and are presented in table 2, some of them also being reported in [64].
144Ce-144Pr 106Ru-106Rh 90Sr-90Y 42Ar-42K
τ1/2 285 d 7.2 min 372 d 30 s 28.9 y 64 h 32.9 y 12 h
Qβ (MeV) 0.319 2.996 0.039 3.54 0.546 2.28 0.599 3.52
Table 2: Possible nuclei pairs for a ν¯e source.
144Ce, 106Ru and 90Sr are fission products found within nuclear reactor spent fuels, whereas 42Ar
is too light to be produced by fission processes. Furthermore, the production of 42Ar needs two
neutron captures, starting from stable 40Ar. Because 41Ar has a short lifetime of only 110 min
and 40Ar (n,γ)41Ar reaction has a cross-section of only ∼0.4 barn, massive 42Ar production is very
difficult. Therefore, a solution consisting in the reprocessing and treatment of nuclear spent fuel
rods is more convenient.
The probability of a nuclei to be created during fission processes in nuclear reactor fuel is called
the fission yield and is given in percent 1. However, the fission yield of a given nucleus does not
take into account its possible decay to another nucleus, and is therefore not representative of the
abundance of a given nuclei within spent nuclear fuel. The cumulative fission yield of an isotope is
1The sum of the isotopic fission yield gives 200 % because of the normalization with the number of fissions, not
with the number of fissions products.
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the number of nuclei of the considered isotope per fission when the reactor is at equilibrium. This
quantity is then more interesting for our purpose of finding the best pair candidate because with a
reasonable approximation (very long-lived isotopes never reach equilibrium), it represents a fission
product abundance at reactor shutdown. Table 3 shows the 144Ce, 106Ru and 90Sr cumulative
fission yields for thermal fission of 235U and 239Pu, these two isotopes being the most fissioned
isotopes in nuclear reactors. 144Ce, 106Ru and 90Sr are clearly abundant fission products, but
106Ru suffers from its rather low 235U cumulative yield compared to 144Ce and 90Sr. Since 90Sr-
90Y suffers from a relatively low Qβ leading to a small IBD reaction rate for a given activity, the
144Ce−144 Pr pair is therefore the best candidate for a ν¯e source.
Cumulative fission yield (%)
144
58 Ce 10644 Ru 9038Sr
235U 5.50 (4) 0.401 (6) 5.78 (6)
239Pu 3.74 (3) 4.35 (9) 2.10 (4)
Table 3: Cumulative fission yield for thermal fission of 235U / 239Pu for 144Ce, 106Ru and 90Sr [73].
4 144Ce−144 Pr antineutrino generator
The CeLAND experiment will use a 144Ce−144 Pr source, which is the best compromise between
production feasibility, intrinsic backgrounds and ν¯e interaction rate through the inverse beta decay
reaction.
4.1 144Ce−144 Pr source features
With an atomic number Z=58, cerium belongs to the lanthanide elements. Natural cerium has an
atomic mass of 140.116 g and is a soft, silvery, ductile metal which easily oxidizes in air. Cerium
has two oxidation states (III and IV) and easily converts to CeO2 in contact with oxygen.. Natural
cerium contains four stable isotopes of mass 136 (0.195%), 138 (0.265%) and 140 (88.45%) and 142
(11.1%), respectively. Cerium is the most abundant rare earth element, making up about 0.0046%
of the Earth’s crust by weight.
4.1.1 Nuclear data
There is a considerable interest in the decay of 144Ce since it is a prominent fission product. Nuclear
data reported below are taken from the ENSDF database referring to [59, 60] for 144Ce and [60]
for 144Pr.
F. Y. t1/2 1st β− (keV) 2nd β− (keV) Iγ>1 MeV Iγ>2 MeV W/kCi
235U: 5.2% 284.91d 318 (76%)
184 (20%) 2996 (99%) 1380 (0.007%) 2185 7.99
239Pu: 3.7% 238 (4%) 810 (1%) 1489 (0.28 %) (0.7%)
Table 4: Summary of the features of 144Ce−144 Pr pair. F.Y. are the fission yields of 144Ce, t1/2
the half-lives. β end-points are given for 1st and 2nd nucleus in the pair. The Iγ ’s are the intensities
of the main γ-rays per β-decay above 1 and 2 MeV. The last column is the heat production in
units of W/kCi.
The different cerium isotopes are listed in table 5. Up to now, 35 radioisotopes have been charac-
terized, the most stable ones being 144Ce with a half-life of 284.91 days, 139Ce with a half-life of
137.640 days, and 141Ce with a half-life of 32.501 days. The remaining radioactive isotopes have
half-lives shorter than 4 days, most of them having half-lives shorter than 10 minutes. Note that
the 136,138,142Ce isotopes are predicted to undergo double beta decay but this process has never
been observed.
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Parent Z A isotopic mass (u) half-life decay daughter spin/parity
119Ce 58 61 118.95276(64) 200 ms β+ 119La 5/2+
120Ce 58 62 119.94664(75) 250 ms β+ 120La 0+
121Ce 58 63 120.94342(54) 1.1(1) s β+ 121La (5/2)(+)
122Ce 58 64 121.93791(43) 2 s β+ 121,122La 0+
123Ce 58 65 122.93540(32) 3.8(2) s β+,p 123La, 122Ba (5/2)(+)
124Ce 58 66 123.93041(32) 9.1(12) s β+ 124La 0+
125Ce 58 67 124.92844(21) 9.3(3) s β+,p 125La,124Ba (7/2-)
126Ce 58 68 125.92397(3) 51.0(3) s β+ 126La 0+
127Ce 58 69 126.92273(6) 29(2) s β+ 127La 5/2+
128Ce 58 70 127.91891(3) 3.93(2) min β+ 128La 0+
129Ce 58 71 128.91810(3) 3.5(3) min β+ 129La (5/2+)
130Ce 58 72 129.91474(3) 22.9(5) min β+ 130La 0+
130mCe 2453.6(3) keV 100(8) ns (7-)
131Ce 58 73 130.91442(4) 10.2(3) min β+ 131La (7/2+)
131mCe 61.8(1) keV 5.0(10) min β+ 131La (1/2+)
132Ce 58 74 131.911460(22) 3.51(11) h β+ 132La 0+
132mCe 2340.8(5) keV 9.4(3) ms IT 132Ce (8-)
133Ce 58 75 132.911515(18) 97(4) min β+ 133La 1/2+
133mCe 37.1(8) keV 4.9(4) h β+ 133La 9/2-
134Ce 58 76 133.908925(22) 3.16(4) d EC 134La 0+
135Ce 58 77 134.909151(12) 17.7(3) h β+ 135La 1/2(+)
135mCe 445.8(2) keV 20(1) s IT 135Ce (11/2-)
136Ce 58 78 135.907172(14) Observationally Stable 0+
136mCe 3095.5(4) keV 2.2(2) µs 10+
137Ce 58 79 136.907806(14) 9.0(3) h β+ 137La 3/2+
137mCe 254.29(5) keV 34.4(3) h IT(99.22%)/β+(.779%) 137Ce/137La 11/2-
138Ce 58 80 137.905991(11) Observationally Stable 0+
138mCe 2129.17(12) keV 8.65(20) ms IT 138Ce 7-
139Ce 58 81 138.906653(8) 137.641(20) d EC 1399a 3/2+
139mCe 754.24(8) keV 56.54(13) s IT 139Ce 11/2-
140Ce 58 82 139.9054387(26) Stable 0+
140mCe 2107.85(3) keV 7.3(15) µs 6+
141Ce 58 83 140.9082763(26) 32.508(13) d β− 141Pr 7/2-
142Ce 58 84 141.909244(3) Observationally Stable 0+
143Ce 58 85 142.912386(3) 33.039(6) h β− 143Pr 3/2-
144Ce 58 86 143.913647(4) 284.91(5) d β− 144mPr 0+
145Ce 58 87 144.91723(4) 3.01(6) min β− 145Pr (3/2-)
146Ce 58 88 145.91876(7) 13.52(13) min β− 146Pr 0+
147Ce 58 89 146.92267(3) 56.4(10) β− 147Pr (5/2-)
148Ce 58 90 147.92443(3) 56(1) s β− 148Pr 0+
149Ce 58 91 148.9284(1) 5.3(2) s β− 149Pr (3/2-)
150Ce 58 92 149.93041(5) 4.0(6) s β− 150Pr 0+
151Ce 58 93 150.93398(11) 1.02(6) s β− 151Pr 3/2-
152Ce 58 94 151.93654(21) 1.4(2) s β− 152Pr 0+
153Ce 58 95 152.94058(43) 500 ms β− 153Pr 3/2-
154Ce 58 96 153.94342(54) 300 ms β− 154Pr 0+
155Ce 58 97 154.94804(64) 200 ms β− 155Pr 5/2-
156Ce 58 98 155.95126(64) 150 ms β− 156Pr 0+
157Ce 58 99 156.95634(75) 50 ms β− 157Pr 7/2+
Table 5: Cerium isotopes. EC refers to Electron capture and IT to Isomeric transition. There are
10 meta states.
The half-life of the 144Ce, 284.91 days (τ = 411.04 days), is long enough for uploading of irradi-
ated fuel from the nuclear reactor, transportation to the reprocessing facility, extraction of cerium,
cerium source packaging and transportation to the detector site. It is however not too long, mini-
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mizing the mass of reprocessed fuel and source material within the detector. The 144Ce is therefore
a very good compromise, suitable for a year time scale experiment. The source compactness re-
quirement imposes the time elapsed prior to the source manufacturing time. The time period must
be shorter than a few years (typically three) starting from the end of the nuclear fuel irradiation
within the reactor core.
Figure 5: (left) Decay scheme of 144Ce. The two intensities sum to give total transition intensity
from each energy level in percent. Energies of γ rays and levels are given in keV. (right) Decay
schemes of the 17.3-min 144Pr. Energies of γ rays and levels are given in keV.
A major concern regarding an ν¯e source is the rate and energy of accompanying γ-rays because it
is a source of backgrounds for the detection of ν¯e, and requires substantial shielding to comply with
safety rules for anybody working in the vicinity of the source during production, transportation,
and deployment. For an artificial ν¯e source, the main channel of γ-ray background is the long-lived
γ-emitting isotopes of the same chemical element simultaneously extracted from irradiated nuclear
fuel. In case of cerium, all isotopes except 139Ce and 144Ce (see table 5) decay fast enough not to
be sources of γ backgrounds for the CeLAND experiment. 139Ce cumulative fission yield is only
2.10−9 for 239Pu and 9.10−12 for 235U, at least 7 orders of magnitude lower than 144Ce. Therefore
139Ce gamma background yield is negligible. The main concern then arises from the decay of
144Ce and its daughter 144Pr deexcitation. The decay scheme of 144Ce and of 144Pr ground and
exited states are shown in figure 8 and 5, respectively. The most dangerous source of background
originates from the energetic 2185 keV γ produced by the decay through excited states of 144Pr
(see also table 6). This γ line has a branching ratio of 0.7%. Starting from a β activity of 75
kCi, this leads to a huge γ activity of 525 Ci (1.9 1013 Bq) that must be attenuated through a
thick high-Z shielding material, such as tungsten alloy. In addition, it is necessary to guarantee
a low level of radio-impurities containing long-lived γ radioisotopes during the cerium chemical
extraction procedure. Specifically, rate of γ-rays above 1 MeV from impurities must be smaller
than 10% of the 2185 keV γ rate, leading to an activity smaller than 50 Ci/75 kCi, ensuring that
this gamma background is negligible.
4.1.2 Decay heat
The 144Ce−144 Pr pair releases heat through the collisions of β and γ radiations with atoms.
Details of the 144Ce−144 Pr decay chain and heat production per decay branch are given in table 6.
A 144Ce−144 Pr source releases 7.991 ± 0.044 Watt/kCi (0.56 %) of thermal power per units of
activity, mostly coming from β decay electrons (95.72 %) contained in the cerium oxide.
A 75 kCi activity therefore corresponds to an overall 599.3 W thermal power. For CeLAND phase
1, the heat will be dissipated within the 3 kilotons of water circulating in the outer detector. Heat
release as a function of time (and decreasing activity) is given in table 7. Starting with a 75 kCi
source at the KamLAND site, thermal power decreases down to 387 W after 6 months (roughly
corresponding to a 50 kCi activity). Two years after the start of the data taking with an initial 75
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Figure 6: γ ray spectrum of 144mPr isomers in equilibrium with144Ce, measured with a 17% HPGe
detector [61]. Energies are in keV; the energy dispersion is 0.76 keV/channel. SE and DE stand
for single and double escape peaks, respectively. An asterisk denotes a γ ray from the background;
the Σ symbol indicates summing a peak from 2185.6 and 696.5 keV γ rays.
kCi source, the heat release drops down to 101 W (corresponding to about 13 kCi). After 10 years
of running with an initial 75 kCi source, the heat release should be roughly 0.1 W, corresponding
to an activity of 10 Ci.
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End-point Energy Intensity Dose
energy (keV) (keV) (%) (keV / Bq)
144Ceβ branches
318.7 (8) 91.1 (7) 76.5 (5) 69.7 (7)
238.6 (8) 66.1 (6) 3.90 (20) 2.58 (13)
185.2 (8) 50.2 (6) 19.6 (4) 9.84 (23)
Total 100 82.1 (11)
144Ce γ lines
133.515 (2) 11.09 (19) 14.8 (3)
99.961 (15) 0.04 (4) 0.04 (4)
80.12 (5) 1.36 (6) 1.09 (5)
59.03 (3) 0.0004 (5) 0.00058 (3)
53.395 (5) 0.1 (8) 0.053 (4)
40.98 (10) 0.257 (16) 0.105 (7)
33.568 (10) 0.2 (22) 0.067 (8)
Total 16.2 (4)
144Prβ branches
2997.5 (24) 1222 (11) 97.9 (4) 1196 (5)
2301 (24) 895 (11) 1.04 (20) 9.31 (18)
1436.5 (24) 526.27 (99) 0.0014 (3) 0.0074 (16)
924.7 (24) 322.85 (92) 0.00062 (5) 0.002 (16)
913 (24) 306.77 (96) 0.0067 (10) 0.0206 (3)
811.8 (24) 267.19 (93) 1.05 (4) 2.81 (11)
342.6 (24) 98.9 (78) 0.00015 (3) 0.00015 (3)
322.2 (24) 92.33 (77) 0.00087 (9) 0.0008 (8)
254.6 (24) 71.11 (76) 0.0003 (10) 0.00021 (7)
Total 100 1208.2 (53)
144Pr γ lines
2654.9 (2) 0.00015 (3) 0.0039 (7)
2368.3 (3) 5.4 10−5 (13) 0.0013 (3)
2185.66 (7) 0.694 (15) 15.2 (3)
2072.9 (2) 0.00023 (3) 0.0047 (6)
2046.3 (2) 0.00027 (5) 0.0055 (11)
1978.82 (10) 0.00087 (8) 0.0173 (16)
1560.97 (10) 0.00020 (3) 0.0031 (4)
1489.17 (5) 0.278 (5) 4.14 (7)
1388.02 (10) 0.00672 (9) 0.0933 (12)
1376.27 (10) 0.00039 (4) 0.0054 (6)
1182 (3) 5.37 10−5 6.34 10−4
864.45 (10) 0.0024 (3) 0.0209 (23)
814.1 (10) 0.0032 (3) 0.0262 (22)
696.51 (3) 1.342 9.35
674.95 (10) 0.003 (3) 0.0199 (18)
624.7 (1) 0.00113 (3) 0.00704 (18)
Total 28.9 (4)
Total β branches 1290.3 (64)
Total γ lines 45.1 (8)
Total X lines 3.2 (1)
Total CE and Auger lines 9.5 (3)
Grand total 1348.0 (75)
Table 6: Energy released for branch of 144Ce and 144Pr decays [73]. The 144mPr is neglected, due
to its very low branching ratio (<1%) and its very low β decay probability (0.7 %) compared to γ
isomeric transition (99.3 %).
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Time (months) 0 6 12 18 24 36 48 60 120
Activity (kCi) 75.0 48.1 30.8 19.8 12.7 5.2 2.1 0.9 0.01
Activity (PBq) 2.78 1.78 1.14 0.73 0.47 0.19 0.08 0.03 0.0004
Heat (W) 599 384 246 158 101 41.7 17.1 7.05 0.0829
Table 7: 144Ce−144 Pr activity and heat release as a function of time after the production. After
20 years, the activity is only 50 Bq.
4.1.3 Electron and antineutrino spectra
Electron and antineutrino spectra of a given β decaying radioisotope are simply related by energy
conservation at the β-branch level. However, 144Pr undergoes several β-branch decays with forbid-
den transitions and makes the 144Pr antineutrino spectrum calculation difficult. Here is presented
a direct calculation of the neutrino spectrum using the Fermi theory [78]. With E and p the total
energy and momentum of the beta particle, the differential energy spectrum at the β branch level
writes:
N(E)dp = Kp2(E − E0)2F (Z,E)dp, (13)
with E0 the end point energy. Fermi theory is a simplified description of β decay and needs to
be corrected for various atomic and nucleus effects, which especially affect low energy electrons
and hence high energy neutrinos. The 144Pr spectrum is carefully modeled by including major
corrective effects to the Fermi spectrum:
N(E)dp = Kp2(E − E0)2F (Z,E)L0(E,Z)C(E,Z)R(E,M)G(E,Z)S(Z,E)B(E,Z)dp, (14)
where:
 L0(E,Z) and C(E,Z) takes respectively into account the finite size and mass of the nucleus
considering both electromagnetic and weak interactions [79] (Fermi theory considers the
nucleus to be point-like with an infinite mass)
 R(E,M) is the recoil effect on the phase space factor and the nucleus Coulomb field, with
M the nuclear mass [79]
 G(E,Z) corresponds to radiative corrections (i.e. emission of virtual or real photons in the
decay process) [80]
 S(Z,E) is the screening of the beta particle [81] by the atomic electrons
 B(E,Z) is the weak magnetism correction [75] (similar to induced electromagnetic current
in a moving Coulomb field, but for weak interactions).
All corrective terms have the structure 1 + δ(E,Z,M). These terms represent up to a few percent
correction to the Fermi spectrum (eq. 13). The recoil effects turn out to have a nearly negligible
impact (0.013% correction) on the uncorrected Fermi spectrum. Figure 7 compares the relative
weights of each of the above-mentioned corrections. Any theoretical uncertainty associated to a
correction is propagated in the spectrum. The dominant source of uncertainty comes from the
weak magnetism effect. Following the prescription of [75], a linear correction is used to estimate
the weak magnetism effect. The linear coefficient is estimated following two approaches. The
first one uses a theoretical calculation based on the so-called impulse approximation [75]. The
second one assumes that vector currents in a β-decay behave the same as for an electromagnetic
decay process (conserved vector current hypothesis), allowing to make an analogy between a Fermi
type (vector current) β-decay and an electromagnetic M1 γ-decay. In such an approximation,
the linear coefficient of the weak magnetism correction can be estimated using the measured M1
electromagnetic form factors of a reduced (and hardly representative) sample of 13 nuclei, which
present the same nucleus quantum number change in their respective M1 γ-decay and β-decay[75,
77]. Both methods give strongly different outputs and the first one is retained as the default
estimation. The second largest uncertainty is associated to the screening correction term, and
comes from the modeling of the distribution of the atomic electrons. Various models along with
their different results [81] are used to conservatively estimate the uncertainty on the screening
correction.
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Figure 7: Comparison of the relative amplitudes for the corrective terms. The weak magnetism
correction has been computed here using the impulse approximation. See text for further details.
The 144Pr neutrino spectrum is modeled combining the eight most important β-branches (highest
branching ratios) using data from National Nuclear Data Center. They are summarized in table 8.
The resulting neutrino spectrum along with errors associated to the uncertainties in the considered
corrections is displayed in figure 9. As a cross-check, the electron and antineutrino spectra have
been calculated using the Bestiole code [76]. Bestiole has been originally developed to predict an-
tineutrino spectra from nuclear reactors (which comprises thousands of β-branches) using available
experimental informations in different nuclear databases. The agreement with our modeling, once
integrated with the same binning configuration, is very good. The 144Pr antineutrino spectrum
exhibits the same two discontinuities at 811.8 keV and 2301 keV, which are the end-point energies
of the β-branches of intensity of 1.05% and 1.04%, respectively. The next five branches do not
have a strong influence on the total spectrum and have a negligible contribution.
In order to refine our knowledge of the source spectrum, β spectroscopic measurements using
cerium nitrate samples prepared by PA Mayak are scheduled to begin by the end of 2013. Our
144Pr β spectrum modeling will be adjusted to the data to reduce uncertainties on the shape of the
neutrino spectrum, and especially to constrain the weak magnetism correction, which dominates
the shape error budget.
The full 144Ce−144 Pr antineutrino spectrum is displayed in figure 8. The 144Ce lifetime is much
shorter than that of 144Pr, which enables us to assume secular equilibrium. The first peak corre-
sponds to the 144Ce parent β decay with an end-point energy of 318.7 keV. ν¯e originating from
144Ce β decay are hence not detectable through the inverse beta decay process. The second broad
peak corresponds to the 144Pr β decay with an end-point energy of 2997.5 keV. The ν¯e spectrum
which lies above the inverse beta decay threshold of 1.8 MeV represents about 50% of the 144Pr
emitted ν¯e.
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Branching
ratio (%)
Quantum
numbers Qβ(keV) type
97.9 0+ 2997.5 First non unique forbidden
1.05 1− 811.8 Allowed
1.04 2+ 2301.0 First unique forbidden
6.70 · 10−3 0+ 913 First non unique forbidden
1.4 · 10−3 2+ 1436.5 First unique forbidden
8.7 · 10−4 0+ 322.2 First non unique forbidden
6.2 · 10−4 2+ 924.7 First unique forbidden
3.0 · 10−4 0+ 254.6 First non unique forbidden
Table 8: 144Pr β-branches included in the analytical model, sorted by decreasing probability
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Figure 8: 144Ce−144 Pr antineutrino emitted spectrum assuming secular equilibrium.
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Figure 9: Left panel: Complete neutrino spectrum for eight first β-branches of 144Pr with optimistic
weak magnetism correction. Right Panel: Differential observable neutrino spectrum from 144Pr
including the IBD cross-section.
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As a first application, our model was used to predict the rate of inverse beta decay events that
will be detected in KamLAND. It is also used to estimate the uncertainty coming from the shape
of the neutrino spectrum. The visible energy spectrum in the detector is obtained by multiplying
the IBD cross-section to the 144Ce−144 Pr antineutrino spectrum. It is shown on the right panel
of figure 9. The threshold of IBD is high enough to neglect all influence of Cerium as its transition
end-points are well below 1.8 MeV. The cross-section is computed using prescriptions from [81],
with a pre-factor of 9.61 10−48 cm2/Mev2 (which has a negligible 0.1% uncertainty due to the
neutron lifetime uncertainty). Then, the expected event rate in the KamLAND detector is
Nν = NCeρpFgeo
ˆ ∞
0
σIBD (Eν)S (Eν) dEν , (15)
where ρp = 6.62 × 1022 cm−3 is the density of protons in the KamLAND detector and Fgeo is a
geometric factor (with dimension of a length) including the detector and source geometry. For a
cylindrical source of 13.5 cm diameter and 13.5 cm height, positioned 9.3 m away from the center
of a spherical detector of 6.5 m radius, Fgeo = 1.10 m. Considering a pessimistic scenario where
some backgrounds escaping the source (gammas and neutrons) remain unshielded, a tighter 6 m
radius fiducial cut was also considered, giving Fgeo = 0.85 m. NCe is the number of Cerium decays
corresponding to a data taking period T:
NCe =
ˆ T
0
A0e
−ln(2)t
T1/2 dt (16)
= A0
T1/2
ln(2)
[
1− e
−ln(2)T
T1/2
]
,
where A0 is the initial source activity. With a 75 kCi source and a 18-month data taking period,
24165±189 (resp. 18673±146) antineutrinos are expected to be detected in KamLAND considering
a 6.5m radius (resp. 6 m radius) fiducial volume cut. The quoted uncertainties come from the β-
spectrum modeling only, assuming a weak magnetism correction factor calculated using the impulse
approximation, as done in [22].
4.2 144Ce−144 Pr source production
From an extraction and production perspective, cerium is a rather abundant element present at
the 5.5% and 3.7% levels in the fission products of uranium and plutonium, respectively (see table
table 3).
4.2.1 Activity
As agreed with the PA Mayak, the activity of the cerium antineutrino generator will be of 85+15−10
kCi in 144Ce beta activity at delivery in Yekaterinburg. Taking into account the 6-8 % precision of
the activity measurement at Mayak, one guarantee there is a 90 % probability to get the activity
higher than 75 kCi. Remaining free space in source (inner) capsule, if any, will be filled with
additional radioactive cerium oxide if available at the end of the production, up to 100 kCi. Thus,
depending on the fuel age and extraction process there is a possibility that the source activity may
be above 75 kCi at the beginning of the experiment at KamLAND.
4.2.2 Geometry
The spatial extent of the CeO2 source material must be small compared to the neutrino oscillation
length (Losc ∼ 1 m for ∆m2 ∼ 1 eV2 neutrino mass splittings considered above) for the successful
oscillometry measurement. Moreover, the size of the source will directly increase the size and mass
of the shielding, thus requiring a source to be small and compact, with an extension of a few tens
of centimeter.
But several constraints have to be considered. The first consideration is that only a mixture of
all cerium isotopes produced during irradiation can be practically separated from spent nuclear
fuel, since isolating the 144Ce would require a very difficult isotopic separation. So the 144Ce
content of the cerium oxide is limited by fission yields and cooling time. Secondly, the CeO2 will
be manipulated in hot cells, which requires cylindrically shaped capsule and limit the achievable
density of cerium oxide to 4.0± 1 g/cm3.
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Finally, the largest capsule that can be handled routinely in Mayak hot cells is 15 cm in height and
diameter, and safety requirements impose a double container in stainless steel. Mayak will provide
the capsules, 4 mm thick for the outer capsule and 3 mm thick for the inner capsule. Adding the
necessary mechanical gap of 0.5 mm, a maximum of 13.5 cm in diameter remains available for the
CeO2.
4.2.3 Spent fuel seeds
Preliminary computations have been done to study the amount of cerium produced within VVER
reactors for various condition of irradiation. The SAS2H (SCALE-4.4) ORIGEN-S software from
Oakridge was used by the MePhi group in Russia. The content of 144Ce in spent nuclear fuel
(SNF) elements depends on the irradiation history and on the reactor neutron spectrum. The
144Ce isotope mostly results from the decay of 144Cs and is abundantly produced in the fissions
of 235U and 239Pu. The abundance of cerium among produced rare earth elements is about 22%.
Taking these numbers at their face values, about 15 SNF elements would be needed to achieve 75
kCi of 144Ce, but we will see that technical considerations force us to consider about five to ten
times more SNF elements to reach the desired activity.
To optimize the selection of SNF elements in order to maximize the 144Ce content per fuel element
units of mass, a dedicated study was performed by Mayak and MePhi. The general guidelines to
extract the fuel with the highest constant of 144Ce are the following:
1. Select SNF with shortest time of irradiation, since the fission yield for 144Ce of 239Pu is lower
than 235U.
2. Select SNF with highest energy release during the last irradiation, since the 144Ce content
increases with the fission rate and therefore power.
3. Select SNF with the lowest burn-up, for the same reason than the first guideline.
Following these guidelines, a specific activity of 144Ce in the range 31 to 35 Ci/g of SNF can be
expected, corresponding to an absolute activity of 8 to 12 kCi per fuel SNF.
The usual cooling sequence of SNF consists is 3 years of cooling in the power plant storage pool
followed by another 2-year period of SNF being stored at the reprocessing plant. Delivery of
fresher SNF to the reprocessing plant is possible but not conventional. This step would maximize
the amount of activity within a small volume and significantly reduce the amount of SNF needed
to produce a 144Ce source with 75 kCi activity. Each gained month in the source manufacturing
process represents a gain of SNF material of the order of 10%. To guarantee that the source is
compact enough to fit inside the Mayak capsule, the possibility of using SNF with a low cooling
time has been considered and approved by Mayak.
The transport, by train, will probably use a TUK-6 container (or equivalent), which is categorized
as a B(M) container according to the international classification and contains typically up to 3.8
tons of UO2 (see figure 10). To keep the level of radiation within the limits for transportation from
the reactor site to the reprocessing plant with a low cooling time fuel, the container may be not
full or filled with a mix of long and low cooling time fuel.
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Figure 10: TUK-6 container (left) and carriage container (right) for spent fuel transportation from
reactor to reprocessing plant. Each year about 58 tons of SNF are transported from Cola NPP to
Radiochemistry plant RT-1 at PA Mayak (Ozersk, Chelyabinsk region).
An agreement between Rosatom and FSUE Mayak PA has been reached for delivery of ’fresh’ SNF
from the Kola Nuclear Power Plant (VVER-440, 3000 km north of Mayak) with a 1.7 to 2.0 year
cooling period after the end of irradiation. The total mass of this special batch will be about 15
- 16 tons, including 7 - 8 tons with cooling time in the range of 580 till 640 days (1.6-1.75 years).
The second part of SNF has cooling time 3.5 years and more. The burnup value of this "fresh"
fuel will be in the range of 48 - 51 MW.d/t.
4.2.4 Spent fuel cooling time and mass of CeO2 containing 75 kCi of 144Ce
The ratio of 144Ce in cerium extracted from SNF as a function of time t, assuming 144Ce is the
only cerium long-lived cerium isotope is,
χ(t) =
mass(144Ce, t)
mass(Ce, t)
=
mass(144Ce, t)
mass(144Ce, t) + mass(stableCe)
=
m144(t)
m144(t) +mstable
(17)
According to MePhi (private communication during the CeLAND meeting in Paris, 22 July 2013),
the content of 144Ce in cerium with tc= 3 years after the end of irradiation is:
χ(3) = χ3 = 0.6
+0.1
−0.15 %
Here tc is an arbitrary reference cooling time, used by MePhi for standard simulations. The mass
of stable cerium can be written:
mstable =
m144(3)
χ3
−m144(3) = (1− χ3)m144(3)
χ3
(18)
and the mass of 144Ce is:
m144(t) = m144(0) e
−λt = m144(3) e−λ(t−tc)
with λ = ln(2)/τ1/2 = 2.8158 10−8 s−1. Then the 144Ce mass ratio as a function of time t is:
χ(t) =
m144(3) e
−λ(t−tc)
m144(3) e−λ(t−tc) +
(1−χ3) m144(3)
χ3
=
χ3 e
−λ(t−tc)
1− χ3 + χ3 e−λ(t−tc) (19)
The 144Ce mass ratio is plotted on the left panel of figure 11. The source mass is related to the
144Ce activity A(t) through:
A(t) = λ N144(t) = m144(t) Na λ
144
⇔ m144(t) = 144×A(t)Na λ . (20)
with Na the Avogadro number. Finally, the source mass is given by:
msource(t) = m144(t)× 176
144
+ mstable(t)× 174
142
' A(t)Na λ χ(t) (176.5− 0.5χ(t)) (21)
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Figure 11: Left: 144Ce/CeO2 mass ratio as a function of time after last irradiation at the reactor
(and its uncertainty band computed from reactor core simulations). Right: Mass of CeO2 for a 75
kCi activity in 144Ce as a function of the cooling + production time. The antineutrino generator
should be realized with maximum cooling + production time of about 4.5 years in order to fit
enough radioactive material inside the inner capsule (assuming a cerium oxide density of 4 g/cm3).
The mass of CeO2 required to achieve an activity of 75 kCi in 144Ce, is given as a function of time
in the right panel of figure 11. Assuming a 2-year cooling time and 1 year of production, the source
mass included is between 4.8 kg and 6.4 kg. The last case corresponds to a cylinder of 15.4 cm in
height and diameter with a minimal density of 3 g/cm3. With all the parameters taken at their
baseline values, the source mass is 5.45 kg, its volume is 1.36 liter corresponding to a cylinder of
12.0 cm in height and diameter. Considering the uncertainty on density and χ3, the largest capsule
has been validated (15 cm in the external diameter of the outer capsule, 13.5 cm in the internal
diameter of the inner capsule).
4.2.5 Cerium production line
The Federal State Unitary Enterprise Mayak Production Association is a Russian spent fuel repro-
cessing facility located in the city of Ozersk, which performs the reprocessing of Russian SNF. It
can reprocess spent fuel from various nuclear power plants (VVER, BN-600, and BN-350) as well
as from research reactors, atomic-powered ships and submarines.
Russia reprocesses its SNF with the PUREX process which extracts uranium and plutonium.
A secondary and optional phase can extract a highly concentrated waste of rare-earth elements
(REEs), and a final step allows to separate through liquid chromatography a specific element, such
as samarium used for powerless lights.
Standard reprocessing at the radiochemical plant
Procedures of spent fuel processing, starting from cutting and digestion through standard PUREX
process to preparation of the required feed for further individual radionuclides separation are
depicted in figure 12.
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Figure 12: First procedures of PUREX process and Selected Spent Fuel Processing to obtain the
required feed for further individual radionuclides separation.
First step is cutting of the ends of fuel assemblies (FA) by electroarc process. Then fuel part
of FA is cut into small pieces and dissolved by nitric acid. The resulting solution is in form of
pulp with superfine components of graphite, silicone and other elements. These components can
affect the following chemical procedures. This is why one of important stages of reprocessing is
clearing of the pulp by high-molecular organic flocculating agent and filtration on bulk filter made
of stainless steel metallic spheres and natural minerals.
Procedure of U, Th and Np recovery (PUREX process) is the extraction process using multistage
mixer settlers with the mixture of tributyl phosphate and hydrocarbon solvent. A similar process
is implemented by COGEMA (France) and BNFL (UK). After recovery of U, Pu and Np, PUREX
raffinate is transported to another distant workshop of Radiochemical Plant for its concentrating
by evaporation. During the evaporation procedure a large quantity of nitric acid is recovered from
the raffinate for its reiterative use. Due to big volume of communication pipeline (the distance of
about 1.5 km) the minimum batch of PUREX raffinate which is transported is about several tens
of cubic meters of the solution. Such a volume of the PUREX raffinate is equivalent to about 10
tons of SNF. It means that minimum quantity of SNF of certain quality we should select is about
10 tons.
Most of raffinate after evaporation procedure is directed to vitrification unit for disposal of high
radioactive waste in form of phosphate glasses. This is one of main task for the Radiochemical
Plant RT1 of PA Mayak in the framework of Russian program of closed fuel cycle.
Sometimes, accordingly to special request from Customers, a part of PUREX raffinate is
pumped to another distant workshop, Radioisotope plant, for recovery of radioisotopes for medicine,
scientific and industrial applications. Before pumping the solution is diluted by water to improve
the mobility of this pulp.
Additional reprocessing at radioisotope plant
First operation at Radioisotope plant is recovery of 137Cs isotope by sorption procedure (see
figure 13). At the radiochemical plant the raffinate passed two stages of concentration and pu-
rification of REE and TPE concentrate by double oxalate precipitation. First and second oxalate
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procedure consists of oxalate precipitation of REE and TPE followed by dissolving the precipitate
by nitric acid (digestion of oxalate). Precipitation of oxalates allows to separate the bulk of impu-
rities present in the raffinate and to obtain relatively pure REE and TPE group. Main impurities
which should be removed are Cesium (137Cs) and Strontium (90Sr), and chemical elements after
corrosion (Fe, Ni, Cr).
Figure 13: Individual radionuclides separation and refining.
Cerium Recovery
REE and TPE concentrate after correction by means of nitric acid are transferred by a pipeline to
the chromatographic facility for separation of REE and TPE at the distance of about 500 m. The
pipeline and additional vessels should be purified before this procedure.
Separation of cerium is performed by complexion displacement chromatography (CDC) using a
series of columns, the first one being a sorption column and the others being separating columns.
REEs are sorbed as a uniform band in the sorption column and are later separated using a series
of columns packed with a resin containing retaining ion (Ni2+, Cu2+, H+, etc.).
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Figure 14: Schematic view of the cerium extraction process.
The main role of the retaining ions is to decompose the REE complex during the entire separation
process and to favor repeated sorption-desorption cycles. The complexes of the eluent with the
retaining ion should be stronger than those with the ions being separated. The sorption of the
retaining ion on the resin should be weaker than that of the ions being separated. To separate
REEs, a complexing agent containing displacing ions, NH4+, or Na+, is used. The sorption of this
agent is stronger than that of REEs. When a column is washed with this agent, NH4+ cations
substitute REE3+ cations. As a results, the resin is transformed into the NH4+ form and REE ions
form complexes with the eluent (EDTA). These complexes are decomposed by reaction with the
resin in the form of the retaining ion Ni2+. The released REE ions are sorbed again and displace
Ni2+. Thus, separate REE bands are formed in the columns. The order of these bands corresponds
to the strength of the REE complexes (see figure 15). A diagram of the cerium extraction process
is given in figure 14. An generic output of the chromatography is given in figure 15.
Figure 15: Selection of cerium through displacement chromatography. We note here that cerium
if far away from curium and americium which guarantee a low concentation of neutron emitter
impuritites in the final product.
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4.2.6 144Ce source pressing and encapsulation
The source will be encapsulated in a cylindrical sealed double stainless steel container, the outer
capsule having a 15 cm external diameter. The outer capsule will be 4 mm thick, the inner capsule
3 mm thick, and the mechanical gap will be 0.5 mm (to be confirmed by Mayak), leading to an
inner capsule with a 13.5 cm in internal diameter (see figure 16 for a preliminary design proposed
by CEA before Mayak constraints were known). The final design is ongoing. The capsules will be
welded inside a hot cell (argon-arc welding). The tightness of the capsules will be tested using the
Mayak’s standard helium leakage test. The capsule will be certified by Mayak according to the
ISO 9978-92 (Radiation protection - Sealed radioactive sources - Leakage test methods) regulation.
Figure 16: Preliminary 75 kCi 144Ce−144 Pr source capsule (cylinder with a diameter of 15 cm
height and radius). Dimensions have to be updated, and a new design of the lid holder (mushroom-
like) is necessary for proper manipulation inside the hot cells.
The cold pressing of the cerium oxide will be done in a hot cell at PA Mayak. In principle, a
density of 5 g/cm3 can be achieved since the CeO2 has a theoretical density of 7.2 g/cm3, but it
could be as low as 3 g/cm3. This is being checked with large samples in laboratory. The current
density is expected to be 4 ± 1 g/cm3. Prior to insertion, the cerium oxide will be pressed under
the form of large solid pellets, with a diameter slightly smaller than the capsule.
Finally, the CeO2 material and source container will be qualified as SFRM (Special Form of Ra-
dioactive Material). This is a mandatory step prior to the source container insertion within the
tungsten shielding.
The CeLAND CeO2 source production scenario assumes a 1-year production time between SNF
arrival at the PA Mayak reprocessing facility and source delivery in Japan. Mayak’s schedule is
slightly shorter, about 10 months.
4.2.7 Target contamination
144Ce will be extracted from spent nuclear fuel elements. Though expected to be very small,
contamination of the final 144Ce source with other radio-elements is unavoidable. The extraction
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process leads to a small contamination from other REEs and minor actinides, that may be however
relevant for realizing a neutrino experiment.
The REE contaminants are γ and β emitters, which could bias the activity measurement or par-
ticipate to γ-induced accidental background. The contamination in REEs must therefore be small
enough to provide a negligible contribution to activity, a requirement easily achieved through the
CDC method used at PA Mayak. Because the source has to be shielded against 2.185 MeV 144Pr
γ-rays, any γ-rays from contaminants will be shielded as well. As explained in section 5, the
γ attenuation length is close to its minimum at 2.2 MeV and will therefore drives the shielding
dimensions.
Actinides are produced in a reactor core through successive neutron captures and beta decays from
238U, as shown by figure 17. On one hand, they are α, β and γ emitters feeding long decay chains
that require similar high-Z shielding than for REE contaminants. On the other hand, the heavy
neutron rich actinides could be more hazardous since they also undergo Spontaneous Fission (SF).
This emission of several γ-rays and neutrons is therefore a potential source of correlated background
for the CeLAND experiment.
Figure 17: Production of minor actinides during irradiation of a reactor core.
Our contamination specifications are consequently the following:
 Thermal power of nuclides other than 144Ce and 144Pr should be less than 0.1 % of the
thermal power delivered by 144Ce and 144Pr (7.991 ± 0.044 W/kCi), in order to guarantee
the precision of the calorimetry measurement;
 Gamma activity above 1 MeV should be less than 0.1 % of the beta activity of 144Ce;
 Activity of spontaneous fission radio impurities to be defined by Saclay in collaboration with
the MePhi institute, ICP institute and Isoflex USA.
Since the attenuation corresponding to 2.185 MeV γ-rays is very close to the minimal attenuation
length of tungsten, any high energy γ-rays (above 1 MeV) will at least be as attenuated as the
2.185 MeV γ-rays from 144Pr. The 0.1% 144Ce beta activity specification on γ-rays therefore ensures
that the most active γ-rays will come from the 144Pr 2.185 MeV γ emission (0.7% branching ratio).
Thus, the gamma radiation shielding dimensions should only be driven by the activity of the 144Pr
2.185 MeV γ-ray.
30
4.2.8 Source induced background
The CeLAND source could potentially add backgrounds to the signal measurement through decays
of 144Ce and 144Pr (β− electron, gamma, bremsstrahlung) or through decays of impurities (see
previous section), if deployed too close or inside the KamLAND target volume. Since the 144Ce
is extracted from spent nuclear fuel, a particular concern is the presence of heavy minor actinides
that undergo SF with non negligible branching ratios (reaching 74 % for 250Cm), emitting γ-ray
cascades and several fast neutrons.
4.2.8.1 Accidental backgrounds First, β− decays of 144Pr emit 2.185 MeV γ-rays (0.7%
branching ratio), which lie both within the prompt and delayed energy windows. The biological
shielding should be able to provide enough attenuation for deployment outside the tank (an addi-
tional plate could be placed between the shielding and the buffer tank). However, a deployment
at the center of the detector would require much more shielding.
Second, neutrons from SF can scatter out of the source despite the high-Z shielding. Escaping
neutrons can be captured on the detector materials, such as hydrogen in water, oil or in the liquid
scintillator, consequently emitting 2.2 MeV γ-rays both affecting the prompt and delayed energy
windows. As opposed to the 2.185 MeV γ-rays, which can be easily attenuated through the high-Z
shielding, neutron induced background might dominate any other source of backgrounds despite a
much lower activity in actinide’s SF, which depends on the 144Ce contamination with heavy minor
actinides.
4.2.8.2 Correlated backgrounds The only correlated backgrounds induced by the source
come from SF. Fast neutrons can reach the liquid scintillator target and make a proton recoil
faking the prompt signal and slow down until being captured in the liquid scintillator, with the
same coincidence time than a neutrino signal. Fortunately, the hydrogen-rich buffer oil separates
the source from the target liquid scintillator, and fast neutrons have great chance to loose en-
ergy through scattering before the target. Moreover, detector response to fast neutron is affected
by quenching and fast neutrons rarely give more than 1.022 MeV of visible energy (IBD energy
threshold). This background should therefore not affect the experiment.
The multiple neutron background is potentially more hazardous. Spontaneous fission releases sev-
eral neutrons in two opposite beams (neutrons are actually released by the two energetic fission
fragments and are therefore strongly boosted), of which two can be scattered in the detector di-
rection and then be captured on hydrogen inside or close to the target. The γ-rays resulting from
the two captures could fake an IBD signal. Table 9 shows the half-life, branching ratios to sponta-
neous fission and specific neutron activities for all americium, curium, berkelium and californium
isotopes with half-life higher than 180 days. The nuclei of interest are the curium and californium
isotopes with an even mass number (244,246,248,250Cm and 248,250,252Cf). All americium isotopes
and other curium and californium isotopes with odd mass number have negligible branching ratios.
Berkelium isotopes have very short half-life period, and nuclei heavier than californium (Es, Fm)
can be safely ignored since they are produced in negligible quantities in a reactor core and have a
very short half-life period. It is worth noting that the mean number of neutron released per SF N
increases with the nucleus mass number, following roughly N = 0.1094A−23.94 in our mass range.
For instance, 252Cf releases 50 % more neutrons per SF than 241Am (3.6 and 2.4 respectively).
The specific activities of the relevant heavy minor actinides have to be weighted by their abundance
in spent nuclear fuel to correctly estimate the level of multiple neutron correlated background in
the KamLAND detector. First, nuclei with odd mass number generally have large fission cross-
sections, leaving radiative capture as a minor deexcitation process. Second, fresh nuclear fuel does
not contain any isotope heavier than 238U. All heavy minor actinide isotopes are then produced
through a long chain of successive neutron captures and β− decays, with the fission trap on odd
nucleon number isotopes. The burn-up of spent nuclear fuel has then to be large enough to start
producing heavy elements. Such threshold in burn-up of course increases with the isotope mass.
Moreover, in power plant, reactors are generally operated at constant power with low enriched
fuel. The neutron flux is then roughly constant, and the mass of 238U is so large that it can be
considered constant. The production of heavy actinide isotope with mass number A+1 depends
of neutron flux, cross-section, decays and mass of isotope A. The mass ratio between an heavy
actinide isotope A and the following isotope A+1 is therefore expected to be constant once the
threshold in burn-up of isotope A+1 is reached. Available data show that the total mass of a given
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curium isotope with even mass number A is roughly a factor 102 more than the following even
isotope A+2. This effect should then counterbalance the increase of SF branching ratios with mass
number. Detailed simulations are ongoing to precisely estimate heavy isotope abundance is spent
nuclear fuel.
Isotope Half-life Branching ratio
to SF
Specific neutron
activity (neutron/g)
241Am 432 y 4 · 10−12 1.2
242mAm 141 y 4.7 · 10−11 46
243Am 7370 y 3.7 · 10−11 0.72
243Cm 29 y 5.3 · 10−11 2.6 · 102
244Cm 18 y 1.4 · 10−6 1.2 · 107
245Cm 8500 y 6.1 · 10−9 1.1 · 102
246Cm 4730 y 3 · 10−4 1.0 · 107
248Cm 3.5 · 104 0.083 4.2 · 107
250Cm 9000 y 0.74 1.5 · 1010
249Bk 320 d 4.7 · 10−10 9.4 · 104
248Cf 333 d 2.9 · 10−5 5.4 · 109
249Cf 351 y 5 · 10−9 2.5 · 103
250Cf 13 y 8 · 10−4 1.1 · 1010
251Cf 898 y 1 · 10−7 2.0 · 104
252Cf 2.65 y 0.030 2.2 · 1012
Table 9: Spontaneous fission properties of minor actinide isotopes with half-life > 0.5 y
The most abundant curium isotope is 244Cm, with a specific neutron activity comparable to 246Cm
and 248Cm. According to our preliminary GEANT4 simulations, the correlated background induced
by 244Cm is 5000 events per year in the KamLAND detector, with a 6 m radius fiducial volume cut
and assuming a contamination of 10−9Bq/Bq. This assumption is taken from a limit on the level
of contamination by minor actinides observed in Promethium production. However, the amount
of multiple neutron correlated background in KamLAND is expected to be lower, because Cerium
is more efficiently separated from actinides than Promethium using the complexion displacement
chromatography method (see figure 15).
A neutron shielding solution, using saturated boric water surrounding the tungsten alloy shielding,
is envisaged if the contamination in heavy minor actinides turns out to be non negligible. Com-
mercial tungsten alloys are known to resist to boric water at room temperature. Corrosion test
are currently being performed to clearly demonstrate that point.
4.2.9 Summary
Below are summarized the specifications of the source in the standard scenario that we will rely
on in estimating the physics and sensitivity reach of the CeLAND project:
1. Spent fuel cooling time less than 2 years prior to transportation to PA Mayak;
2. Source beta activity of 85+15−10 kCi of
144Ce at delivery ;
3. Chemical form of cerium is CeO2 with density 4± 1 g/cm3;
4. External diameter of the capsules is 15 cm, internal diameter is 13.5 cm ;
5. Samples of cerium from the same production batch will be provided with the source.
5 High-Z gamma ray shielding
The most serious source of backgrounds is the decay of the 144Nd 1− excited state, which emits a
2.185 MeV γ-ray with a 0.7% intensity (see table 4). The bremsstrahlung of the 144Pr β particles
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might also be another source of backgrounds. The source must be shielded by a thick high-Z
absorber to attenuate these backgrounds to the required level. With a theoretical density of 19.3
g/cm3, tungsten is widely used in radiation shielding applications and is among the best suited
candidate for this purpose.
5.1 Attenuation of γ rays in CeLAND
The total interaction cross-section of ∼MeV γ rays with matter is equal to the sum of three
partial cross-sections: σ = σf + σc + σp, where σf is the photoelectric effect cross-section, σc
is the Compton interaction cross-section and σp is the pair creation cross-section. A beam of
gamma radiation passing through a layer of absorber material of thickness x will be exponentially
attenuated: I(x) = I0e−(
µ
ρ )ρx, where I0 is the intensity of the incident beam and µ/ρ is the mass
attenuation coefficient. This coefficient is taken from [68] for each CeLAND material that will be
later considered in our γ ray attenuation calculations. The µ coefficient definition is µ = σ × n,
where n is the atomic concentration in the material. In the MeV energy regime, Compton scattering
is the dominant interaction process so that the mass-attenuation coefficient is approximately the
same for absorbers with different Z. This is because the probability of Compton scattering on
atomic electrons is proportional to Z, making µ ∼ σcZn and µ/ρ ∼ σcZ/MA since ρ = n×MA,
where MA is the atomic mass. The inverse of the attenuation coefficient is λ =1/µ and has units of
length, so that it can be associated to a mean free path or an attenuation length. In other words, λ
corresponds to the average distance the γ rays can travel in the absorber without interacting. The
attenuation length dependence on the radiation energy is shown in figure 18 for typical materials
making the CeLAND source and shielding, as well as the KAMLAND detector liquid scintillator.
A summary of the relevant attenuation lengths used for the design of the CeLAND phase 1 and
2 shieldings is given in table 10. The design of the shielding of CeLAND phase 2 is still under
consideration.
γ Absorber Form density λ(1 MeV) λ(2.185 MeV) λ(2.655 MeV)
Tungsten alloy solid 18.5 g/cm3 0.817 cm 1.238 cm 1.288 cm
Mercury liquid 13.5 g/cm3 1.059 cm 1.644 cm 1.709 cm
CeO2 solid 4.5±0.5 g/cm3 3.358 cm 5.089 cm 5.293 cm
Sodium paratungstate liquid 2.8 g/cm3 5.358 cm 8.121 cm 8.446 cm
KamLAND scintillator liquid 0.778 g/cm3 18.000 cm 26.922 cm 30.132 cm
KamLAND buffer oil liquid 0.762 g/cm3 18.367 cm 27.472 cm 30.747 cm
Table 10: Summary of the attenuation lengths of γ absorber being considered for CeLAND. The
biological shielding will consist of the source itself (CeO2) surrounded by a thick tungsten alloy
cylinder. It will be used as a γ-ray shielding for the CeLAND source deployment outside the
detector target. In such a deployment scenario, further attenuation is naturally provided by the
detector buffer oil and liquid scintillator. For deployment inside the KamLAND sphere, a shielding
solution using heavy liquids such as sodium paratungstate or mercury is being considered.
5.2 Biological protection
Any exposure to ionizing radiation presents risks of biological damage. As such, the tungsten alloy
shielding must also act as a biological protection during source transportation and manipulation.
After the source is produced, it will be inserted in the shielding in a hot cell by the Mayak
reprocessing plant.
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Figure 18: γ-ray attenuation lengths of some CeLAND materials. From left to right and top to
bottom: cerium oxide, tungsten alloy, sodium paratungstate, and KamLAND liquid scintillator.
The yellow line indicates the 2.185 MeV γ line produced by the decay through excited states of
144Pr, which set the stronger constraint in the CeLAND source shielding design.
Chemical composition: W (97%), Ni (1.5%), Fe (1.5%)
Density [g/cm3] 18.5
Tensile strength at 20 °C [MPa] 800
Oxidation resistance up to 600 °C
Thermal conductivity at 500 °C [W/mï¿œK] 70-90
Modulus of elasticity [GPa] 385
Hardness [HRC] 43
Yield strength at 20 °C [MPa] 600
Breaking elongation at 20 °C [%] 10
Coefficient of thermal expansion [10−6 K−1] 5.0
Table 11: Mechanical and thermal properties of a typical tungsten alloy used for radiation shielding
applications.
5.3 Equivalent dose
In order to assess the tungsten shielding dimensions, and especially the thickness, a number of
factors must be taken into consideration:
 the nature of the ionizing radiation
 the strength of the source, which drives the intensity of the 2.185 MeV escaping γ-rays and
thus the required attenuation to suppress this background
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 the level of exposure of the area surrounding the source to ionizing radiations, with parameters
such as time and distance from the source to evaluate the impact of escaping radiations on
human bodies
The only ionizing radiation which eventually escapes from the source are γ-rays. As a first estimate,
the equivalent dose (in Sievert) induced by a radioactive point source at the center of the shielding
is computed. The absorbed dose (Gy/s) is given by:
D(J/g/s) = A[Bq]× 1
4pid2[cm2]
× µ
ρ
[g/cm2]en × E[J] (22)
where d is the source-person distance in cm, A is the source γ activity (in Bq) at the surface of the
biological protection (i.e. after shielding), µ/ρ is the mass absorption coefficient (the fraction of
energy of the gamma rays transferred to the medium, in cm2/g), and E the energy of the escaping
γ-ray (in Joule). Usually, µ/ρ ∼ 25 g/cm2 for γ-ray energies between 1 and 3 MeV. Furthermore it
is almost medium independent, as explained in the previous section. The equivalent dose (in Sv)
is calculated by multiplying the absorbed dose by the γ radiation weighting factor, w=1. After
plugging in the correct numerical factors in equation 22, the equivalent dose becomes:
D(mSv/h) = 4.24×A[Ci]× E[MeV]/d[m]2 (23)
For a 75 kCi 144Ce−144 Pr source the activity corresponding to the 2.185 MeV γ rays (BR=0.7%)
is 525 Ci. Considering a 16-cm thick spherical tungsten alloy shielding (d=18.5 g/cm3, attenuation
length of 1.26 cm at 2.185 MeV) the 2.185 MeV γ activity is reduced to 1.3× 10−3 Ci at the surface
of the biological protection. According to equation 23, the absorbed dose received at 1 m from the
shielding is 14 µSv/h. As a comparison, the maximum tolerable annual dose for people working
in environments with ionizing radiations is given by international regulations to be 20 mSv/y (see
table 12), corresponding to about 1730 hours/y of exposure for somebody standing 1 m away from
the source.
Criteria IAEA dose Limitfor exposed workers
Effective dose limit for workers in category A 20 mSv/y
Effective dose limit for workers in category B 6 mSv/y
Maximum effective dose allowed in any single year 50 mSv/y
Total work life (50 y) 400 mSv
Table 12: IAEA radiation dose limits for various working conditions.
A more accurate computation of the radiation dose using the GEANT4 simulation package has
been performed. We consider here a 75 kCi 144Ce−144 Pr source in the form of CeO2, encapsulated
in a 5-cm radius sphere with a density of 4 g/cm3. A sphere-shaped tungsten alloy shielding is
simulated taking a typical composition for tungsten alloy with a density of 18.5 g/cm3 [69]. The
mechanical and thermal properties of this material are summarized in table 11. The simulated
sphere is 21 cm diameter, leading to a uniform absorption thickness of 16 cm along any direction.
The computed equivalent dose corresponding to the 2.185 MeV emission of 144Pr is 0.930 mSv/h
at the shielding contact. For the 1.489 MeV, the equivalent dose is 0.026 mSv/h at contact. At a
distance of 1 m from the shielding surface, the 2.185 MeV radiation leads to a dose of 0.028 mSv/h.
It is two times higher than the dose obtained with the simple computation of equation 23. This
can be explained by the fact that the simulation also accounts for the degraded γ-rays that escape
the shielding material. The radiation dose associated to the 1.489 MeV line 1 m away from the
biological protection is 0.75 µSv/h. These results confirm that a tungsten alloy thickness of 16 cm
is sufficient to meet the radiobiological protection requirements.
Finally a computation of the equivalent dose was performed by the CEA radio protection division.
The two 2.185 MeV and 1.49 MeV γ-rays have been simulated through the same shielding geometry
and material, using MCNPX v 2.7.a. Other γ rays are neglected, either because of their low energy
or because of their weak intensity. The source was assumed to be CeO2 with a density of 4 g/cm3
and contained in a 1-mm thick capsule made of stainless steel with the same shape and dimensions
as previously described. The equivalent dose rates are summarized in table 13. Though slightly
higher, they are similar to our GEANT 4 computation.
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γ rays energy (MeV) Dose rate at 1 cm (mSv/h) Dose rate at 1 m (mSv/h)
2.185 1.5 4.210−2
1.49 3.910−2 <1.510−3
Table 13: CEA - SPR computations of the radiation dose 1 cm and 1 m away from the shielding.
For completeness, the influence of electromagnetic radiation produced by the deceleration of the
β-decay electrons when deflected by the atomic nuclei (Bremsstrahlung) has been studied. The
mean free path of electrons in matter, δ, is taken from the Katz and Penfold formula [70]:
δ(cm) = 0.412/ρEn, where ρ is the material density in g/cm3, E is the energy of the electron
in MeV, and the scaling index n = 1.265 − 0.0954 ln(E). The maximum mean free path of elec-
trons of 144Ce and 144Pr is given in table 14 for stainless steel, cerium oxide, and a tungsten
alloy. Bremsstrahlung spectra of 144Ce and 144Pr is computed using MCNPX. The obtained X-ray
spectra are converted into dose rates using the software MERCURIAD v1.04. Details of the com-
putation can be found in [74]. The dose rate induced by Bremsstrahlung of β electrons is less than
1 µSv/h at 1 cm and can thus be neglected in comparison with the dose rate directly induced by
the 2.185 MeV γ-ray of the 144Pr decay.
β energy (MeV) Stainless Steel CeO2 Tungsten alloy
0.32 1.110−2 cm 4.2710−3 cm 2.210−2 cm
3.0 1.910−1 cm 8.010−2 cm 3.710−1 cm
Table 14: CEA - SPR computations of the mean free path of electrons in stainless steel, cerium
oxide, and a tungsten alloy.
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Figure 19: Left panel: absorbed dose received at 1 m from a spherical tungsten alloy shielding as
a function of thickness. The gray area represent the range of thicknesses being considered for the
CeLAND experiment, with a cylinder having a 16 cm minimum thickness. The maximum dose is
42 µSv/h. Right panel: Integrated absorbed dose for a 16-cm tungsten alloy shielding as a function
of time, when standing next to the source (initial activity of 75 kCi). Category A and B equivalent
dose limits are represented by the light and dark gray bands, respectively. A worker could stand
more than 20 hours at 1 meter from the shielding before receiving an integrated dose of 1 mSv,
assuming an activity of 75 kCi.
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5.4 Insertion of the 144Ce source inside the biological shielding
The 144Ce source will be manipulated and inserted into the central shielding in a hot cell at the
Mayak reprocessing plant. The hot cell has a 1.1 m high and 1.0 m wide single door and can contain
up to 4 tons of material. The crane available in the area is certified to lift a maximum weight of
5 tons. The tungsten alloy shielding will be cleaned at Mayak to avoid surface contamination of
the shielding after being manipulated in the hot cell. The 144Ce source must be inserted in the
shielding downwards from the top.
5.5 High-Z shielding (for the deployment next to KamLAND)
The characteristic signature of an inverse beta decay antineutrino interaction is the time and
space coincidence of a prompt energy deposition (e+ energy deposition) followed by a delayed
energy deposition (neutron capture on hydrogen). The main background to the antineutrino signal
are accidental coincidences between prompt-like (E>0.9 MeV) and delayed-like energy depositions
(E>2.0 MeV) occurring within a time window taken as three neutron capture lifetimes on hydrogen
(equivalent to about ∆T =772 µs), and within a volume of 10 m3. If the prompt and delayed
energy deposition positions can be reconstructed, an additional background rejection of a factor
∆V =1/100 can be achieved.
A dangerous source of accidental coincidences comes from the emission of energetic 2.185 MeV
γ-rays from the decay of the 1− excited state of 144Nd (Table 4). 2.185 MeV γ-rays can easily
mimic the signal neutron capture on hydrogen at 2.2 MeV and the signal of a positron above 0.9
MeV, generating an accidental coincidence signal. The rate of accidental coincidences must then
stay small enough compared to the expected antineutrino interaction rate within the KamLAND
detector (16000/y for phase 1). Hence, the reduction of the rate Rγ of escaping γ-rays is a key
parameter in computing the shielding dimensions. To first order, this requirement translates into:
R2γ,phase1 ×∆t×∆V 16000/y leading to Rγ,phase1 ≤ 5 Bq . Starting from an initial rate of 19.4
TBq for the 2.185 MeV γ-ray line (0.7% of 2.77 PBq), this requirement on the reduction of Rγ
imposes an attenuation of ∼ 10−12 .
5.5.1 γ-ray absorption specification
In the first phase of the experiment, the 144Ce−144 Pr emitter will be placed as close as possible
from the steel tank within the circulating water shielding. The minimum foreseen distance from the
center of the KamLAND detector is 9.6 m. The shielding thickness is computed taking into account
additional attenuation provided by different media between the source and the liquid scintillator
volume: water plus a 1-cm thick stainless steel vessel (λ = 4.15 cm) plus 2.5 m of mineral oil (λ =
26.9 cm). As a conservative assumption, the self-absorption of γ-rays within the CeO2 capsule and
the solid angle effect are not taken into account. Achieving a 10−12 attenuation in this geometric
configuration finally leads to a 16-cm thick tungsten alloy (18.5 g/cm3).
5.5.2 Radiopurity specification
An important remaining source of background could be the tungsten shielding itself, especially
in the second phase of the experiment where the shielding will be in contact with the liquid
scintillator. The activity induced by impurities inside the tungsten shielding are here required to be
less than ∼1/10 of the activity of the 2.185 MeV γs able to escape the shielding without interaction.
This requirement ensures the absence of a significant background contribution from the tungsten
shielding. For the deployment in the outer veto or in a room close to the detector, conservative
estimates can be computed as described in the previous section, by imposing a maximum tolerable
background rate of Rγ,phase1 ≤ 0.5 Bq. GEANT4 simulations have been run in the CeLAND phase
1 deployment scenario, with a 16 cm thick spherical shape tungsten alloy shielding placed 9.6 m
away form the KamLAND detector center. Taking into account the most dangerous γ-ray lines
emitted in the different primordial decay chains or nuclei, the maximum tolerable activities in
232Th, 238U, 40K, 60Co are the following:
 232Th (primordial, 232Th-chain) : ∼0.3 Bq/kg
 238U (primordial, 238U-chain) : ∼3 Bq/kg
 40K (primordial) : ∼120 Bq/kg
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 60Co (anthropogenic) : ∼20 Bq/kg
Several tungsten alloy samples from different suppliers have been analyzed, with activities at the
level of ten to hundreds of mBq/kg for the above-mentioned radioisotopes. They are hence all
suitable for the CeLAND phase 1 deployment scenario of the cerium antineutrino generator in the
KamLAND Outer detector.
5.5.3 Preliminary mechanical design
The shielding is made up of a hollow tungsten alloy cylinder with two cavities, each with different
inner diameter and located at different depths: the source fits in the lower cavity at the center
of the shielding and the upper cavity supports the plug to avoid direct radioactive leaks. The
tungsten alloy shielding is 16 cm thick at minimum and weighs about 1.5 tons. It is represented
in figure 20.
Figure 20: Sketch of the tungsten alloy shielding to be used for radiological protection for the
deployment in the outer detector water (OD) or farther from the target liquid scintillator.
The final choice on the tungsten alloy material will mostly be driven by radiopurity requirements
(see previous section). The upper cavity in the shielding is closed by a tungsten alloy lid. The
tightness of the seal is achieved by a Helicoflex O-ring metallic gasket with good resistance to
radiations and high temperatures. Captive screws hold the cap in order to ease its mounting in
the hot cell. The final tightening of the screws will require a high torque and can be done outside
the hot cell (the biological protection is ensured as soon as the cap is plugged on the top of the
shielding). A 1 mm play between the outer capsule and the inner wall of the shielding lower cavity,
as well as a 2 mm chamfer, should ease the insertion of the source in the shielding. Likewise, there
is a 5/10 mm play between the plug and the inner wall of the shielding upper cavity. The loading
of the capsule in the shielding should be done downwards from the top. 2 x 6 threaded M16 holes
on the top and bottom shielding sides allow several handling operations: translation and rotation
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in the hot cell (with a dedicated tool), insertion of the shielding in the transportation container,
in the calorimeter, handling above the manhole at KamLAND or inside the detector. They also
allow holding the shielding during measurements in the KamLAND detector or can be used to fix
supports to protect the bottom surface of the shielding. These threaded holes will be protected
by screws fitted with metallic gaskets to avoid trapping of any dust or any kind of radioactive
particles. A preliminary technical drawing of the CeLAND source shielding is given in figure 21.
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Figure 21: Preliminary drawing of the tungsten alloy shielding to be used for radiological protection
as well as for the first phase of CeLAND, e.g. the deployment in the outer detector water (OD).
6 Source and shielding logistics
Various heavy elements needed for the experiment will be shipped between the different manufac-
turing places to Japan. Here is a summary of the major heavy shipments.
6.1 High-Z shielding transportation
Transport involving non radioactive material:
• shipment from Saclay to Mayak of the tungsten radiological protection ;
• shipment from Saclay to Kamioka of the equipment to measure its activity prior to deployment
and of the tools used to manipulate the source ;
• if the shielding is not manufactured in France, calibration of the calorimeter will impose a transit
through France.
6.2 144Ce−144 Pr antineutrino generator transportation
The most sensitive part is the transportation of the radioactive antineutrino generator between
Mayak and Japan. Transport of radioactive materials must follow requirements stated in the refer-
ence document : Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2009 Edition) issued
by IAEA [IAEA09]. This document describe the type, characteristics and performance of contain-
ers used for these transports, the different forms of the radioactive material and the radiation level
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and temperature outside the transport container.
In our case the parcel (or consignment) which will be transported is composed of the radioactive
Cerium oxide pressed to reach a density around 4 g/cm3 and placed inside a double sealed stainless
steel container ; this object will be inserted in the tungsten shielding at Mayak and will be tightly
closed by a top part in tungsten. Each capsule will be tested for leaks (Helium leak test) and
according to ISO 9978-92 certification procedure (Radiation protection - Sealed radioactive sources
- Leakage test methods).
6.2.1 Transport of radioactive materials
The physical characteristics of the 144Ce−144 Pr and its encapsulation leads to the classification
of the source as a Special form of radioactive material according to the IAEA terminology.
6.2.2 Transport with a B(U) type container
During the transport the 144Ce−144 Pr source contained in its biological shielding will be inserted
and secured in an IAEA approved transport container of type B(U) whose characteristics are
being defined. The plan is to use an existing transport container. As mentioned above the limit
on radiation level will be satisfied thanks to the important tungsten shielding:
• 2 mSv/h in contact with the packaging (or the vehicle);
• 0.1 mSv/h at two meters from the vehicle.
These limits will be checked at each transit points. Vehicles carrying radioactive materials by
definition are in motion; the public exposure times are very short (of the order of a few seconds
to minutes) during transport. The workers involved in the handling of the container will receive
appropriate training on radiological protection. If a member of the CeLAND collaboration attends
to the transportation he/she will be classified in the category B (6 mSv/y) and therefore has no
impact on his/her health. The limit related to temperature concerns the external temperature of
the transport container and not the temperature of the shielding itself.
The transport container of type B(U) must fulfill several requirements as explained above, but
must received an agreement from the safety authorities of the countries involved in the transport.
To simplify the explanations, a US built and certified container in United Stated needs to be recti-
fied if the transport goes (or transits) through Japan. For this procedure Russia and Europe have
mutual agreements to accept containers certified in one of the countries. Agreements of an existing
foreign container in Japan can be a long procedure (several months). The ideal case would be to
reuse a container which has been already used to transport radioactive material from Russia to
Japan.
Two potential transport containers have been identified :
TN TM – MTR
 Engineered by AREVA; used to transport package for irradiated MTR (Material Test Re-
actor) and TRIGA (Training, Research, and Isotope production, General Atomics ) fuel
elements Type B(U)F IAEA 1996
 Criticality Safety Index : CSI : 0
 Certified in Europe, Australia and USA; need a certification in Japan
 External dimensions : H = 2008 mm, D = 2080 mm , weight = 23 400 kg (max. loaded)
 Useful dimensions: Cavity height = 1080 mm; useful cavity diameter = 960 mm
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Figure 22: TN TM – MTR transport container.
JMS-87Y-18.5T
 Engineered by Kimura Chemical Plant; used to transport package for irradiated MTR (Mate-
rial Test Reactor) and TRIGA (Training, Research, and Isotope production, General Atom-
ics) fuel elements
 Certified in Japan and in USA; needs a certification in Russia and possibly a new certification
in Japan by the new safety authority (NRA).
 External dimensions : H 1900 mm – D 2000 mm – Weight : 18 500 kg (max. loaded)
 Useful dimensions: Cavity height: 820 mm - cavity diameter: 660 mm
Figure 23: JMS-87Y-18.5T transport container.
The antineutrino generator transportation is being studied with Areva TN International, Hitachi,
and PA Mayak that offer a complete range of transport and storage solutions for radioactive
materials throughout the entire nuclear fuel cycle. From several meetings with experts we gathered
a wealth of useful informations concerning the transport of our radioactive source. There is a very
limited number of harbors in the world authorized to receive radioactive materials (so called class
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7). Until recently, only the Saint Petersburg and Mourmansk harbors were certified to receive the
class 7 radioactive materials in Russia. In particular on the east coast, on the sea of Japan, up
to very recently no harbor were approved as class 7. Only Yokohama and Tokyo harbors have
the necessary certifications in Japan. Areva TNI transported several shipments of radioactive
material towards (and from) Japan, such as fuel elements to be treated at la Hague plant and
Plutonium and MoX fuel elements. Similarly they have organized the transport from Mayak to
western destinations.
Figure 24: CeLAND transportation routes, via train + boat (A), and airplane (B).
Last fall a transport of enriched uranium took place between Russia and Japan. It transited through
the harbor of Nakhodka on the east coast of Siberia. This possibility will reduce the time (and
the cost) of the transport by a dedicated ship. IT is shown on 24. Indeed, the boat used for this
transport is a fully dedicated boat which means that the cost will include the renting of the boat,
the salary of the crew, the renting of the container and, last but not least, the cost of the insurance.
Air transport IAEA regulations allow transport of radioactive material by air, but, in this case
there is a limit in the activity of the material inside a single container. For the case of 144Ce the
limit is 600 TBq (16.2 kCi), but for 51Cr it is 90 PBq and for 60Co 1200 TBq. Nevertheless the
same regulation does not limit the number of container in a single plane, but each radioactive
source has to be enclosed in a specific container. Thus we studied the possibility to divide our
75kCi 144Ce source into 5 sources of 15 kCi. Even if the individual activity is reduced, we still
need an important shielding to be able to manipulate these sources ; the estimated mass cannot be
less than 500 kg. Existing transport containers dedicated for air shipments are used to transport
alpha or beta sources with no penetrating radiations. In our case, an extra biological shielding in
tungsten is mandatory to be below the radiation limit, but the maximum load for the certification
is largely exceeded; therefore they are not suitable for our purpose.
Special arrangements
Having in mind the constraints on transportation following the usual standard IAEA regulations,
it is wise to look if the regime of ï¿œ Special arrangements ï¿œ as described in paragraph 310 is
more appropriate for our case. It seems useful to quote the text describing this regime:
ï¿œ 310. Consignments for which conformity with the other provisions of these Regulations is
impracticable shall not be transported except under special arrangement. Provided the competent
authority is satisfied that conformity with the other provisions of these Regulations is impracticable
and that the requisite standards of safety established by these Regulations have been demonstrated
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through means alternative to the other provisions, the competent authority may approve special
arrangement transport operations for single or a planned series of multiple consignments. The
overall level of safety in transport shall be at least equivalent to that which would be provided if
all the applicable requirements had been met. For consignments of this type, multilateral approval
shall be required. ï¿œ
6.2.3 Transport with a C type container
The IAEA and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) fabricated a series of Czech-design
SKODa VPVr/M transport overpacks, developed specifically for spent fuel storage and transport
inside the standard twenty-foot ISO-containers. Sixteen such SKODa VPVr/M overpacks were
produced and subsequently certified first in the Czech republic and then in Russia, where they are
now labelled as TUK145/C. This container has now performed spent fuel deliveries by automobile,
rail, river and sea transport. Moreover it is the first world’s first Type C package certified for
the air transport of SNF in compliance with the classification given in IAEA TS-R-1 Regulations,
without any restriction on the ANG activity.
TUK-145/C
 Engineered by Skoda in Czech Republic; used to transport package for LEU SNF.
 Certified in Russia for SNF; needs an extension of certification in Russia for containing
cerium, only (not considered to be an obstacle) and an extension of the certification in Japan
by the new safety authority (NRA).
 External dimensions : H 2155 mm – D 1500 mm – Weight : up to 35 000 kg (max. loaded)
 Useful dimensions: Cavity height: 820 mm - cavity diameter: 660 mm
Figure 25: TUK145/C transport container.
The TUK145/C cask is of a unique construction that allows it to be loaded and unloaded from
below and from the top. The cask body is made of cast iron. The cask inner walls are plated
with aluminum. Leak-tight containment is provided by the metallic Helicoflex seals. The inner
cavity of the cask is backfilled with helium. The standard basket would have to be replaced by a
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custom basket to fit the cerium antineutrino generator with a reduced shielding not exceeding 450
kg. This corresponds to a thickness of approx. 8.5 cm, leading to a dose rate at 1 m of 10 mSv/h.
The basket could be designed by the Sosny Science and Production Firm and fabricated by the
OZNO plant in Ozersk, russia.
The TUK145/C container could be used for the transportation of a 75 kCi 144Ce ANG with
a reduced, 8.5 cm thick W-alloy shielding. It would be loaded on a truck at PA Mayak, and be
transferred to Yekaterinburg airport and loaded into an aircraft (AN-124-100), including the truck
that would finally drive from the Japanese airport to the Kamioka mine for unloading. This would
necessitate a special operation at the Kamioka site to unload the 144Ce ANG with its reduced
shielding from the TUK-145/C and to immediately load it into the additional shielding cylinder,
8 cm thick as well in order to reach the overall 16 cm thickness.
7 Activity measurements
7.1 Requirements
The source activity is a key normalization parameter, directly linked to the prediction of the
number of expected events and to the sensitivity of the experiment, particularly at high ∆m2. So
the minimal uncertainty on activity is desirable. To ensure the competitiveness of the experiment,
a maximum of 2 % uncertainty on activity is considered, 1 % being the goal.
The main technique considered to measure the activity is the calorimetry, which is a global tech-
nique relatively easy to interpret and calibrate (compared to radiation measurement). According
to nuclear database, the specific activity of the 144Ce−144 Pr couple is 7.991± 0.044 W/kCi, so a
0.56 % systematic uncertainty will in any case limit the calorimetry sensitivity. In any case, the
source would be inside its tungsten biological protection to contain gammas, so the calorimeter
must be able to support about 1.5 ton and a cylinder of roughly 60 cm in height and diameter.
Other techniques rely on radiation measurement (β or γ) on a sample of the source, with extrap-
olation to the source by weighing.
7.2 Calorimetry
7.2.1 Principle
The proposed calorimetric measurement of the source is based on the fact that emitted β, γ , X
and Auger radiation will heat up the source and the tungsten shield leading to a well-defined power
rate. The temperature increase of the object is described by:
dT
dt
=
P
C
− T− Text
τ
(24)
where T is the temperature at a given time t (in K), P the power released by the source (in W),
C the heat capacity (in J.K−1) of the system measured and τ (in s) describes the thermal losses
of the calorimeter toward the exterior.
Several different techniques can be used:
 the temperature increase (dTdt ) in a calorimeter maximally insulated from the environment
can be measured (such as in Gallex [66]), which implies negligible heat losses during the
whole measurement and to calibrate the heat capacity;
 the equilibrium temperature (when dTdt = 0) can be measured and compared to a calibration
phase;
 the heat can be transferred to another system and then measured, typically to a fluid such
as water.
τ can be minimized down to be negligible, and C and τ (if any remaining) can be evaluated
precisely in a preliminary calibration phase of the system with known heat sources.
7.2.2 Data
 144Ce half life: 284.91 days
 144Pr half life: 17.28 min
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 Unitary power: 7.991± 0.044 W/kCi
 Density of tungsten alloy: 18.5 g/cm3
 Heat capacity of tungsten: 130 J/kg
 Thermal conductivity of tungsten: approx. 70 W.m−1.K−1
The thermal power delivered by the source is therefore between 600 and 800 W, for respectively
75 and 100 kCi.
7.2.3 Requirements
1. Uncertainty on thermal power below 1 % (as long as reasonably achievable).
2. Measurement time below 3 days, and preferentially at the hour scale.
3. Capsule temperature below 400°C.
4. Reproducibility of the measurement, which implies a careful and limited instrumentation of
the shielding to ensure reproducibility before and after hot cell manipulations and trans-
portation.
7.2.4 Current Design
The current design (see figure 26) relies on the measurement of heat flow transferred to water,
by measuring the water massive flow rate and the temperature of the water before and after its
circulation at the contact with the shielding. The flow rate can be very precisely measured with
Coriolis flow meter, which directly gives the massive flow rate with uncertainty at the 0.1 % level
or even better with dedicated calibration. The temperature measurement with thermocouple has
an uncertainty of 0.1 to 0.2 K, leading to the requirement for the inflow/outflow water temperature
difference of 40 K. This leads to a flow rate of 4 g/s for 85 kCi.
Figure 26: Preliminary design of the calorimeter. The multi-layer radiation shield, which will
take place in the vacuum between the two tanks, is missing. The shielded source is supported
by 3 pillars, while final design will use 3 strings to hold a board supporting the shielded source.
Thermocouples and the Coriolis flow meter are not shown either.
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The source power is measured by the power evacuated by water. The source has to be insulated
at the watt level to reach 1 % of uncertainty. This can be achieved by a combination of vacuum
(probably secondary), suspension of the source (probably with Kevlar strings), multi-layer radiation
shield and temperature control of the external tank.
This design ensures reproducibility and allows a preliminary study and calibration phase with
electric source power, while being also an absolute measurement since water heat capacity is well
known. The time needed for the measurement will probably be dominated by the time needed
to reach the target vacuum, since the shielding heating will be low and consequently thermal
equilibrium reached in about 1 hour. As soon as both target vacuum and thermal equilibrium are
reached, the measurement is over. Finally, the capsule temperature will be far from 400°C since
the mean shielding surface temperature will be several tens of degrees Celsius.
7.3 Spectroscopy of samples and weighing of the source
Under the assumption of CeO2 uniformity (which should be ensured by the mixing of all the cerium
solution in a single tank, after chromatography at Mayak), one can sample the CeO2 and dilute it,
determine the activity of the sample by radiation spectroscopy and deduce the source activity by
weighing both the source and the sample. Mass measurement can easily achieve excellent accuracy,
thus the main source of uncertainty of this technique is the spectroscopy.
β spectroscopy relies on the measurement of the electron spectrum emitted by the sample. This
measurement is typically realized with a silicon detector, but the interpretation which relies on
simulation (diffusion in sample, back scattering, efficiency. . . ), calibration and background control
can be difficult to control at the target level
γ spectroscopy relies on the measurement of a characteristic gamma ray of the 144Ce-144Pr couple,
such as the 2.185 MeV ray of the 144Pr which is intense and far from common natural background
(above 40K 1.4 MeV ray but still below the 208Tl 2.6 MeV ray). This measurement is typically
realized with a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detector, but the normalization which also relies
on simulation (solid angle, auto absorption, efficiency. . . ), calibration and background control can
also be difficult to control at the target level.
8 144Ce−144 Pr source deployment and data taking
8.1 The KamLAND detector
The KamLAND detector is located under the peak of Ikenoyama (Ike Mountain, 36.42◦N, 137.31◦E)
in the Kamioka mine, see figure 27, with a vertical rock overburden of approximately 2700 meters
water equivalent (m.w.e.).
A schematic diagram of KamLAND is shown in figure 28. KamLAND consists of an active detector
region of ∼1 kton of ultra-pure LS contained in a 13-m-diameter spherical balloon made of 135µm
thick transparent nylon/EVOH (ethylene vinyl alcohol copolymer) composite film and supported
by a network of Kevlar ropes. In addition to providing containment for the LS, the balloon protects
the LS against the diffusion of ambient radon from the surrounding components. The LS comprises
of 80% dodecane, 20% pseudocumene (1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene) by volume, and 1.36± 0.03 g/liter
of the fluor PPO (2,5-Diphenyloxazole). The density of the LS is 0.780 g/cm3 at 11.5◦C.
A buffer comprising of 57% isoparaffin and 43% dodecane oils by volume fills the region between
the balloon and the surrounding 18-m-diameter spherical stainless-steel outer vessel to shield the
LS from external radiation.
An array of photomultiplier tubes (PMTs), 1325 specially developed fast PMTs masked to 17-
inch diameter and 554 older 20-inch diameter PMTs reused from the Kamiokande experiment
are mounted on the inner surface of the outer containment vessel, providing 34% photo-cathode
coverage. A 3mm thick acrylic barrier at 16.6-m-diameter helps prevent radon emanating from the
PMT glass from entering the BO. The inner detector (ID), consisting of the LS and BO regions,
is surrounded by a 3.2 kton water-Cherenkov detector instrumented with 225 20-inch PMTs. This
outer detector (OD) absorbs γ-rays and neutrons from the surrounding rock and enables tagging
of cosmic-ray muons.
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Figure 27: Kamioka mine location.
The KamLAND front-end electronics (FEE) system is based on the Analog Transient Waveform
Digitizer (ATWD) which captures PMT signals in 128 10-bit digital samples at intervals of 1.5 ns.
Each ATWD captures three gain levels of a PMT signal to obtain a dynamic range from one
photoelectron (p.e.) to 1000 p.e. Each ATWD takes 27µs to read out, so two are attached to
each PMT channel to reduce dead time. The FEE system contains discriminators set at 0.15 p.e.
(∼0.3mV) threshold which send a 125 ns long logic signal to the trigger electronics. The trigger
electronics counts the number of ID and OD PMTs above the discriminator threshold with a
sampling rate of 40MHz and initiates readout when the number of 17-inch ID PMTs above the
discriminator threshold exceeds the number corresponding to ∼0.8MeV deposited energy. The
trigger system also issues independent readout commands when the number of OD PMTs above
threshold exceeds a preset number.
The offline analysis takes full advantage of the information stored in the digitized PMT signals by
identifying individual PMT pulses in the waveform information that is read out. The time and
charge are computed from the individual pulses. For each PMT, the average charge corresponding
to a single p.e. is determined from single-pulse waveforms observed in low occupancy events. The
ID PMT timing is calibrated with light pulses from a dye laser, injected at the center of the
detector through an optical fiber. The vertices of spatially localized low-energy (<30MeV) events
are estimated by comparing calculated time-of-flights of optical photons from the hypothetical
vertex to the measured arrival times at the PMTs in KamLAND.
The reconstructed energies of events were calibrated with γ sources in past deployments: 203Hg,
68Ge, 65Zn, and 60Co; and with n+ γ sources: 241Am+9Be and 210Po+13C. These were deployed
at various positions along the vertical axis of the detector and occasionally off the vertical axis
within 5.5 m from the detector center. The energy calibration is aided with studies of background
contaminants 40K and 208Tl, 212Bi-212Po and 214Bi-214Po sequential decays, 12B and 12N spallation
products, and γ’s from thermal neutron captures on 1H and 12C.
The visible energy (Evis) of an event is computed from the measured light yield. Specifically,
Evis is the number of detected p.e. after corrections for PMT variation, dark noise, solid angle,
shadowing by suspension ropes, optical transparencies, and scattering properties in the LS. The
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Figure 28: Schematic diagram of the KamLAND detector at the Kamioka underground laboratory,
including the KamLAND-Zen balloon.
relationship between Evis and the deposited energy (Edep) of γ’s, e±’s, protons, and α’s is non-
linear and modeled as a combination of Birks-quenched scintillation and Cherenkov radiation. The
scale is adjusted so that Evis is equal to Edep for the 2.225MeV γ-ray from neutron capture on
1H. The combined 17-inch and 20-inch PMT energy resolution is ∼6.5%/√Evis(MeV).
The calibration sources are also used to determine systematic deviations in position reconstruc-
tion by comparison with the source’s known position. This comparison gives an average position
reconstruction uncertainty of less than 3 cm for events with energies in the range 0.28 to 6.1MeV.
The KamLAND experiment started operation in March 2002 and has run continuously since then.
The experiment has gone through various phases, the latest phase is a modification to the detector
where an additional balloon at the center of the detector is filled with a mixture of liquid scintillator
and 136Xe to study neutrinoless double beta decay.
8.1.1 Intrinsic detector backgrounds
A number of backgrounds could mask the oscillation signal from the proposed source measurement.
However we demonstrate in what follows that detector background are absolutely not an issue for
CeLAND. We perform a simulation including all backgrounds measured or the last 10 years in
KamLAND as shown in figure 29. Our background generator takes into account:
 accidental events, usually from natural radioactivity.
 cosmogenics, 9Li and 8He.
 (α,n), an α from Polonium (prompt signal) gets captured by a carbon atom deexciting into
oxygen and a neutron (delayed signal from capture).
 geoneutrinos, from U and Th inside Earth’s crust and mantle.
 reactor neutrinos, from the surrounding Japanese and Korean nuclear reactors. This back-
ground will depend on the nuclear activity in Japan at the time of the experiment, but cannot
create significant background contribution even if all reactors in Japan are running at the
full power level.
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Figure 29: Energy distributions of the KamLAND intrinsic backgrounds measured in-situ. From
left to right and top to bottom: accidentals,(α,n), geoneutrinos, reactor neutrinos, 9Li, Sum of all
the previous backgrounds.
8.2 KamLAND infrastructure for CeLAND
This section discusses the transportation of the Ce-ANG antineutrino generator in Japan. There
are three logical steps to transport the Ce-ANG generator from the port of entry to the KamLAND
deployment area:
1. Transportation from a port to the mine entrance;
2. Transportation from the mine entrance to KamLAND entrance;
3. Transportation from the KamLAND entrance to the deployment area.
8.2.1 Transportation of the antineutrino generator to the mine entrance
The Ce-ANG antineutrino generator will arrive at a port on the Pacific Coast (i.e., East-side) of
Japan. The generator will be contained in a BU type container with a weight of 10-25 tons. The
generator in the BU container will have to be transported from the port to the Kamioka mine
entrance.
The national highways are well maintained in Japan and can be used for transportation. A licensed
shipping company can transport Ce-ANG in the BU container across the mountains to Kamioka.
There are several shipping companies that have transported BU containers in Japan. The CeLAND
Japanese group is currently discussing the transportation plan with one such company, HITACHI
Transport Systems (HTS). From these discussions it is clear that the technically most challenging
segment of the transportation is the last 500m, just before the Atotsu entrance to the Kamioka
mine. The road here follows a narrow path along the Atotsu river and includes a small bridge that
may not be able to support the weight of the truck and BU container.
8.2.2 Transportation of the anti neutrino generator to KamLAND entrance
The KamLAND detector is located 2.5 km from the Atotsu entrance of the Kamioka mine, see
figure 30. Most of the tunnel from the mine entrance to the detector is horizontal and should not
be a problem. However, there is a short, 20m long section of the tunnel with a slope that will be
challenging for transportation.
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Figure 30: Access to Kamioka mine entrance from National highway 41.
Once the antineutrino generator arrives at the mine entrance, there are two scenarios:
 The most favorable is the case that the antineutrino generator, contained inside the 1.5-ton
γ-ray shield, can be removed from the BU container for further transportation. The mine
company has equipment that can lift the 1.5 ton container and transport the container to
the KamLAND entrance. This scenario will need detailed discussion with the mine company
regarding regulation, in particular whether we will be allowed to lift Ce-ANG at the entrance
of the mine without the BU container.
 In case the generator cannot be removed from the BU container, the BU container will have to
be transported to the KamLAND entrance on the same truck as was used for transportation
from the port. The truck will have to have the capability to clear the slope on the way
towards the KamLAND entrance.
8.2.3 Transportation from the KamLAND entrance to the KamLAND dome area
It will not be feasible to transport the generator inside the heavy BU container towards the Kam-
LAND dome area. The generator, still inside the 1.5-ton γ-ray shield, will have to be removed
from the BU container at this point at the latest. The 25m3 tank region, at the entrance of
KamLAND-controlled area (see figure 31), can be used to remove the generator and γ-shield from
the BU container. We will have to install lifting fixtures in this area to accomplish this. Once Ce-
ANG is removed, it can be lifted by existing equipment operated by the Kamioka mine company
to the entrance of the KamLAND dome area. The maximum lifting capacity of this equipment is
4 tons and is therefore sufficient for this task.
No heavy machinery can enter the KamLAND dome area. This means that personnel will have
to transport the 3-ton shield with the generator over the last ∼15m. For this we intend to use
cranes, chains or other tools.
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Figure 31: KamLAND area
8.3 Deployment into the outer detector (water veto) and data taking
The existing water Cherenkov detector, the so-called KamLAND OD, provides a straightforward
location for the first phase of source deployment.
Source/detector properties
Source initial activity 75-100 kCi
Source location Water veto
Source-center distance 9.3 m
Fiducial volume radius between 6.0 and 6.5 m
Interactions after 6 months 8930
Shielding composition Tungsten alloy, d=18.5 g/cm3
Shielding dimensions 51 cm height, 54 cm diameter cylinder - TBC
Shielding mass 1.5 tons
Table 15: CeLAND Phase I deployment data
8.3.1 Detector issues and source deployment
The recirculating water provides a thermal bath for the hot source. Buffer oil provides a free
shielding of more than 2.5 m with a density of 0.75. Finally spatial constraints for source location
are easier to handle with respect to the detector center. In addition, the placement of the source
in the OD avoids complicated issues of cleanliness and W-shielding radiopurity. Nevertheless, a
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Figure 32: Sketch of the 3 different locations under consideration.
dedicated infrastructure for the transport and lifting of source on the KamLAND detector upper
platform has to be designed and realized. In order to prevent the unlikely scenario of a radioactive
material contamination in the detector, the source and its biological shielding have to be isolated
from the OD. It is thus planned to put it inside a “sock” as sketched in figure 33. This sock, most
likely made of stainless steel, will act as an additional shielding for the source intrinsic γ’s and will
be filled with water or any other liquid that will act as a temperature and neutron flux moderator.
8.3.2 Signal and backgrounds
Assuming a moderator thickness of 10 cm, the source will be located at about 9.3 m from the
detector center, separated from the active liquid scintillator volume by at least 2.8 m. CeLAND
data are given in Table 15. In the case of no-oscillation we estimate that 14650 neutrino events in
one year are expected within the detector fiducial volume (taken as R<6.5 m inside the balloon
containing the liquid scintillator). The expected number of interactions is given in Table 15.
The energy and distance traveled determine the oscillation probability of the νe flux. Using the
GEANT4 KamLAND Monte-Carlo simulation we simulated 10 million events. However results
that follows are renormalized to 20000 to match the expectation for a one year run with a 75 kCi
source located 9.3 m away from the detector center.
Figure 35 and shows the effect of νe → νs oscillation as a function of energy and distance from the
source. It is displayed as a function of R/E in figure 39. It also illustrates the fractional oscillation
effect normalized to the expected, unoscillated event rate. In what follows, to be conservative,
signal is being considered within a radius of 6 m with respect to the detector center to limit the
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Figure 33: Ce-ANG is contained inside a stainless steel enclosure (“sock”) and suspended into the
Outer Detector.
contribution of the accidental background. This fiducial cut could probably be relaxed to use the
whole liquid scintillator contained in the balloon. As an illustration we considered, as a baseline,
the following neutrino oscillation parameters: ∆m214 = 2 eV2, sin
2(2 θ14) = 0.1 .
Months 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 48
R<6 m 4950 8930 12110 14650 18330 20710 22170 23160 24180
R<6.5 m 6425 11560 15680 18970 23740 26800 28710 29970 31330
Table 16: Expected νe interactions inside KamLAND with a 75 kCi 144Ce antineutrino generator
at 9.3 m from the detector center as a function of the exposure for 2 definitions of the fiducial
volume, R<6 m (current KamLAND analysis) and R<6.5 m (extension of the fiducial volume to
the KamLAND balloon surface).
8.3.3 Expected sensitivity
This section illustrate the expected sensitivity of the CeLAND experiment for an antineutrino
generator deployed at 9.3 m from the target detector center.
8.4 Alternative deployment into the Xenon Room and data taking
Given the technical issues raised by a deployment in the OD, another option has been studied: the
possibility of placing the source outside the detector volume. Two locations are being considered:
the Xenon room and the Control room as shown infigure 32. We will focus on the Xenon room which
is currently being used to store and purify the Xenon used for the KamLAND-Zen experiment.
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Figure 34: KamLAND top platform and OD hatch to be used for the source insertion inside the
OD.
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Figure 35: Left panel: Simulation of signal events in the non-oscillation case, for a source located
at Y ∼ 6.8 m and Z ∼ 6.8 m (here, 9.3 m away from the detector center). Right panel: Radial
distribution of the signal (blue without oscillation, red with oscillation) and background events
(green). Backgrounds are enhanced by a factor 20 to be visible on the plot. The origin of the
radius is taken at the center of the detector.
8.4.1 Detector issues and source deployment
An alternative option for the deployment of Ce-ANG is the xenon facility room (Xe-LS room)
that is used for the KamLAND-Zen phase of the experiment. There are significant challenges here
as the area is completely filled with equipment to process the xenon and load it into the liquid
scintillator. In this case, Ce-ANG would have to be lifted through a narrow corridor (600mm
width) to the back of the area, see figure 43. An additional 80mm of tungsten shielding would be
necessary to allow people to occupy the area without making it into a controlled radiation area.
The most optimal spots in the Xenon room and the Control room are respectively located 12 m
and 13 m from the detector center. Given the relative easiness of integration in both cases, the
shorter baseline of the Xenon room is advantageous. In addition we are considering the option
of performing the calorimetric activity measurement in the Xenon room as well; this would allow
start of the data taking while the source is still in the calorimeter, therefore increasing the number
of detected neutrinos.
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Figure 36: Left panel: Energy distribution of the signal in case of non-oscillation (blue) and oscilla-
tion (red) and the background (green, enhanced by a factor 20). Various background components
are stacked in the inset. Right panel: Radial distribution of the signal and background with the
same color codes. Only the sum of all backgrounds is represented, dominated by the geoneutrinos.
The origin of the radius is taken at the center of the source, 9.3 m away from the detector center.
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Figure 37: Left panel: normalized radial distribution of the signal and background in case of
non-oscillation (blue) and oscillation (red) and the background (green, enhanced by a factor 20).
Each bin content at equidistance to the source is divided by the total scintillator volume at the
corresponding distance. Right panel: zoom on the radial normalized distributions. Oscillation
parameters are ∆m214 = 2 eV2, sin
2(2 θ14) = 0.1 in the 3 active + 1 sterile neutrino hypothesis.
8.4.2 Signal and backgrounds and sensitivity
Even though the signal quality is lowered by the increase of baseline at these two locations, it
would allow CeLAND to basically become a background-free experiment. Indeed, at 12 m, the
gamma and neutron activities of the source are no longer an issue. Besides, if needed, it is much
easier to put additional shielding in the Xenon room than in the OD. The sensitivity is shown in
figure 44.
8.5 Running in parallel with KamLAND-Zen
The KamLAND-Zen experiment, dedicated to the search of the rare neutrinoless double beta
decay process (0ν2β) with 136Xe, has been installed in the center of the KamLAND LS balloon
in 2011[71]. It consists of a 3.08 m nylon-based transparent balloon (IB) filled with 13 tons of
Xe-loaded liquid scintillator as shown in figure 28.
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Figure 38: Advantage of ν¯e sources providing both R and Evis oscillation patterns. IBD rate for a
75 kCi 144Ce source deployed in the OD of KamLAND, in 10 cm radius bins and 100 keV bins of
visible energy, Evis=Ee+2me. In 1.5 year, 20,000 ν¯e interact within the detector (with a fiducial
volume define as R<6m), for the no-oscillation scenario (top-left panel). The other panels show
the expected oscillation signal for ∆m2new=1, 2.5, 6.3 eV2 and sin
2(2θnew)=0.16.
A double beta decay process consists of the simultaneous emission of two electrons with (2ν2β)
or without (0ν2β) neutrino emission. In the case of 136Xe, the 2ν2β energy spectrum consists
of a continuum up to the nucleus Q-value of 2.458 MeV while the 0ν2β spectrum should be a
Dirac delta distribution at this Q-value. Taking into account the KamLAND energy resolution of
6.6%/
√
E(MeV ) leads to an overlap of this 0ν2β signal with the neutron capture signal at 2.2 MeV
and the signals from several radioactive isotopes such as the 214Bi from natural Uranium. These
backgrounds have been thoroughly studied by the KamLAND-Zen collaboration and, in order to
suppress the antineutrino background from both prompt and delayed events of the IBD process, a
1 ms coincidence cut is applied to the KamLAND-Zen data[72]. Furthermore, by loosing the time
and space criteria we will achieve a ~99.97% rejection efficiency, similar to 214Bi-Po. The remaining
number of 2.2 MeV γ capture will be then much lower than any other in-situ backgrounds, at the
level of a few events per year.
The CeLAND experiment will not be an additional source of background for the already installed
KamLAND-Zen experiment. However, the background of Zen for CeLAND might be worth looking
at.
The energy window of interest for 0ν2β in 136Xe is located between 2.2 and 3.0 MeV which is the
end-point of the 144Pr antineutrino prompt spectrum (figure 45). Besides, with a 90 % CL upper
limit of 0.034 evts.ton−1.day−1, the 0ν2β background is be considered negligible for both prompt
and delayed events.
However with an event rate of 80.2 ± 1.8(stat) ± 3.4(syst) evts.ton−1.day−1and its continuous
spectrum up to the 136Xe Q-value, the 2ν2β could be considered a non-negligible background for
the detector central region. In the case of CeLAND, this region is located at the center of the layer
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Figure 39: Signal displayed as a function of the variable R/E (L/E on the plot). Statistical error
bars are included assuming 18 months of data taking and a fiducial volume defined by R<6.5
m. The shape uncertainty on the current knowledge of the praseodymium neutrino spectra is
included, as well as an 1.5% uncertainty on the source activity. Two oscillation scenarios are given,
for ∆m2new=0.5 and 2.0 eV2 and sin
2(2θnew)=0.1, and compared with the no-oscillation case.
Months 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 48
R<6 m 3060 5520 7480 9050 11320 12770 13710 14300 14940
R<6.5 m 3930 7080 9610 11630 14530 16410 17620 18380 19190
Table 17: CeLAND in Xenon room: Expected νe interactions inside KamLAND with a 75 kCi
144Ce antineutrino generator at 12 m from the detector center as a function of the exposure for 2
definitions of the fiducial volume, R<6 m (current KamLAND analysis) and R<6.5 m (extension
of the fiducial volume to the KamLAND balloon surface).
[7.76 ; 10.84] m from the source and contains about 30 % of the events (6700 events for an overall
number of 20000 events). A quick computation using the 2ν2β event rate and the KamLAND IBD
time window of 620 µs gives a total number of coincidences induced by the double beta signal of
2.57× 10−3 for a data taking period of 1.5 year. Even though the 2ν2β event rate can be considered
negligible, an additional spatial cut is still needed around the KamLAND-Zen mini-balloon and
especially its piping line since it induces a high background rate due to natural radioactivity. This
spatial cut only affects the delayed IBD events with the following: Rd > 2.5m and ρd > 2.5m, Zd
> 0m (vertical central cylinder cut at the upper hemisphere)[80].
In conclusion KamLAND-Zen is a negligible source of background for CeLAND as well and both
experiments can run simultaneously during CeLAND run.
8.6 Additional systematic studies
In this section we evaluate the impact on the experimental sensitivity of: the finite extension of
the CeANG, the effect of the finite energy and vertex resolutions, and the knowledge of the source
activity. We found out that only only the latter could significantly affect the experiment.
8.6.1 Finite source size effect
Since the cerium material will be contained in a cylinder the ν¯e emission cannot be exactly taken
as a point like source. We evaluated the impact of the slight extension of the source through
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Figure 40: Expected sensitivity to exclude the non-oscillation. We assume an initial activity of 75
kCi with a source 9.3 m from the center. The fiducial volume is starting from the detector center
and extends to a radius of 6.5 m. Results are given for 1.5 year of data taking for a rate+shape
analysis (left panel), and for a shape only analysis (right panel). The normalization uncertainty is
taken at 1.5%.
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Figure 41: 95% C.L. expected sensitivity to exclude the non-oscillation, as a function of the activity
of the source. We assume the antineutrino generator to be places at 9.3 m from the detector center.
The fiducial volume is starting from the detector center and extends to a radius of 6.5 m. Results
are given for 1.5 year of data taking for a rate+shape analysis (left panel), and for a shape only
analysis (right panel). The normalization uncertainty is taken at 1.5%.
Monte-Carlo simulations and found out that a 15 cm-scale CeANG provides a sensitivity as good
as the point like source case (that will indeed be used for all other computations). Results are
displayed in figure 46.
8.6.2 Energy resolution
CeLAND sensitivity may depend on the energy resolution of the KamLAND detector. As stated
previously in this proposal, the energy resolution of KamLAND detector is 6.5%/(E_vis (MeV))0.5.
The impact on CeLAND sensitivity was evaluated for a 18 months long run and the CeANG located
9.3 m away from the detector center. The energy resolution was varied from 2.5% to 15% as a flat
value independent of energy. The results are shown in figure 47. The sensitivity is only marginally
degraded for ∆m2 between 1 to 10 eV2. Since KamLAND published energy resolution ranges from
4.4 % to 6.5 % at 1 MeV visible energy, corresponding conservatively to the black lines on all plots
since the positrons induced from the source have an energy between 1 and 2.3 MeV. The energy
resolution is therefore not an issue for the CeLAND. Exclusion contours are given at the 95% CL
for a fiducial volume taken as 0<R<6.5 m. Improvement of the energy resolution would,slightly
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Figure 42: 3σ discovery potential illustrated for two examples: ∆m214 = 1 eV2, sin
2(2 θ14) = 0.1
(left) and ∆m214 = 2 eV2, sin
2(2 θ14) = 0.075 (right) . We assume the antineutrino generator to be
places at 9.3 m from the detector center. The fiducial volume is starting from the detector center
and extends to a radius of 6.5 m. Results are given for 1.5 year of data taking. The normalization
uncertainty is taken at 1.5%.
Months 3 6 9 12 18 24 30 36 48
R<6 m 2580 4660 6320 7640 9560 10780 11560 12080 12630
R<6.5 m 3320 5980 8100 9800 12250 13830 14850 15500 16180
Table 18: CeLAND in Control room: Expected νe interactions inside KamLAND with a 75 kCi
144Ce antineutrino generator at 13 m from the detector center as a function of the exposure for 2
definitions of the fiducial volume, R<6 m (current KamLAND analysis) and R<6.5 m (extension
of the fiducial volume to the second nylon vessel).
enhance the sensitivity of the shape only analysis for ∆m2>2 eV2.
8.6.3 Vertex resolution
KamLAND’s vertex resolution may impact sensitivity of CeLAND and a simulation study was
conducted to evaluate it. In this study, the CeANG was located 9.3 m from the detector center
for the duration of 6 and 18 months. The vertex resolution was varied from 10 to 25 cm. The
results are shown in figure 48. The sensitivity is marginally degraded for ∆m2 between 1 to 10
eV2. KamLAND’s vertex resolution of 12 cm/(E_vis[MeV])0.5, or 8 cm to 12 cm in the CeLAND
energy range of interest, corresponds approximately to the black lines on all plots, and it is not
expected to be an issue, though reconstruction will have to be calibrated in the outermost region
of the target volume. In any case one expects no concern induced by vertex resolution effect for
the experiment. Exclusion contours are given at the 95% CL for a fiducial volume is taken as
0<R<6.5 m.
8.6.4 Uncertainty on the source activity
Uncertainty in the knowledge of the CeANG activity directly impacts CeLAND’s rate measurement
and more significantly the sensitivity at delta ∆m2 above a couple of eV2. The simulation study
was conducted to assess the sensitivity of CeLAND to the systematic uncertainty in the rate
of the CeANG. The CeANG’s activity uncertainty was varied in the range from 0.5% to 3%.
The results are shown in figure 49. As can be seen in the plot, the impact of the absolute rate
uncertainty is significant especially for smaller values of mixing angle and higher values of ∆m2.
The measurement of the absolute activity of the source will be performed prior to deployment in
the dedicated calorimeter described earlier. Another measurement will be performed at the end of
the deployment run. The plan is to measure the CeANG activity with 1.5% precision or better.
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Figure 43: Xe-LS facility room, an alternative deployment area for Ce-ANG.
9 144Ce−144 Pr source disposal
At the end of the experiment, the source activity will have decreased by a factor of 6 or so. However,
all radio-protection safety rules will still apply for the removal of the source from the detector.
The source disposal will be facilitated by the radioactive decay of cerium. We provide below the
evolution of the state of the cerium ANG with time elapsed since its production (see also table
19):
 at the end of the experiment, 2 years after the source delivery (at 85 kCi), the source will
only deliver 100 W at 15 kCi;
 after 5 years, heat power will reach the watt scale (for 1 kCi) where heat issues can be
neglected, and dose rate at 1 m of the shielded source will be of the order of the natural dose
rate (some 0.1 µSv/h, depending on the site);
 after 20 years, the source will reach the 10 MBq scale (corresponding to some 100 kBq in γ
activity) where manipulation with bare hand is conceivable and the dose rate at 1 m of the
naked source will be of the order of the natural dose rate ;
 after 25 years, the source will reach about 100 Bq/kg, which correspond to natural activity
of standard matter;
 after 40 years, the source would reach the Bq scale, but long-lived impurities will probably
limit the decrease in the activity.
For disposal the antineutrino generator will return to PA Mayak in Russia. The transport cost
could be reduced by keeping the source in Japan (Kamioka mine) until its activity is less than 16
kCi (approx. 2 years after production) such as a regular type B(U) container could be used for air
transportation without special arrangement. This should implicitly happen after the data taking
period and further measurement of the source activity.
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Figure 44: Sensitivity to exclude non-oscillation with a 75 kCi antineutrino generator as a function
of the distance between the emitter and the detector center. The xenon/control room sites are
located 12 m and 13 m away, respectively. The left panel shows the rate+shape sensitivity assuming
a normalization uncertainty of 1.5%, whereas the right panel shows the shape only sensitivity, which
is more affected by a longer baseline. Exclusion contours are given at the 95% CL for a fiducial
volume is taken as 0<R<6.5 m.
Figure 45: (a) Energy spectrum of the KamLAND-Zen candidate events with the best-fit back-
grounds, 2ν2β decays and 90 % CL upper limit on 0ν2β decays on the 0.5 < E < 4.8 MeV range.
(b) Close-up on the energy window of interest for 0ν2β after known-background subtraction.
10 Conclusion
The CeLAND experiment offers to deploy a 75 kCi 144Ce−144 Pr antineutrino generator next
or inside the KamLAND detector in order to test both the reactor and the gallium anomalies.
The concept of the experiment is to measure the energy and position dependence of the detected
neutrino flux, characteristic of neutrino oscillation into a 4th state. Consequently this will al-
low to search for eV-scale light sterile neutrino oscillations with mass splittings of ≥0.1 eV2 and
sin2(2θnew) > 0.05. With 1.5 year of data, the anomalous allowed region of mixing parameters
could be probed non ambiguously. CeLAND plans to make use of the existing KamLAND detector
with well-measured backgrounds and systematics. Beside upgrading the KamLAND installation
to safely host the source, most of the new effort involves creating, for the first time, an 75 kCi
144Ce−144 Pr antineutrino and delivering it to the detector, where it could be placed in a first
phase outside the detector, 9.3 m from the center (this phase is the main purpose of our current
proposal), and possibly later inside the target liquid scintillator, but only after the KamLAND-Zen
0νββ run is complete and if a hint of oscillation would be discovered during the first phase. The
cost-scale of the whole experiment is estimated to be less than 5 M$, and data taking could start
within the next 1.5 years, depending of funding and logistic issues being currently investigated.
61
144Ce−ANG (KamLAND, 1.5 y, 9.3 m from Center, 75 kCi, 95% C.L.)
sin2(2θ
new
)
∆m
n
ew2
 
(eV
2 )
 
 
10−2 10−1 100
10−2
10−1
100
101
102
Source Extension = 15 cm
Point−like Source
Source Extension = 50 cm
Source Extension = 100 cm
Reactor ν anomaly, PRD 83 073006 (2011), 95% CL
Reactor ν anomaly, PRD 83 073006 (2011), 90% CL
144Ce−ANG (KamLAND, 1.5 y, 9.3 m from Center, 75 kCi, 95% C.L.)
sin2(2θ
new
)
∆m
n
ew2
 
(eV
2 )
 
 
10−2 10−1 100
10−2
10−1
100
101
102
Source Extension = 15 cm
Point−like Source
Source Extension = 50 cm
Source Extension = 100 cm
Reactor ν anomaly, PRD 83 073006 (2011), 95% CL
Reactor ν anomaly, PRD 83 073006 (2011), 90% CL
Figure 46: Impact of the extension of the source on the sensitivity. The source extension is taken
as a sphere ranging from 0 to of 100 cm diameter. We observe that the sensitivity is not degraded
at all by extensions of the source up to 100 cm, for a rate+shape analysis (left) and a shape only
analysis (right). Exclusion contours are given at the 95% CL for 1.5 y of data taking with a source
located 9.3 m away from the detector center. The vertex resolution of the detector is taken as 15
cm. Fiducial volume is taken as 0<R<6.5 m.
Source age Heat β activity 2.2 MeV γ Dose rate with Dose rate without
(W) activity shielding (µSv/h) shielding (µSv/h)
1 day 678 84.8 kCi 594 Ci 16.4 6.6× 106
1 week 668 83.6 kCi 585 Ci 16.1 6.5× 106
1 month 631 79.0 kCi 553 Ci 15.3 6.2× 106
3 month 546 68.3 kCi 478 Ci 13.2 5.3× 106
1/2 year 438 54.9 kCi 384 Ci 10.6 4.3× 106
1 year 279 35.0 kCi 245 Ci 6.8 2.7× 106
2 years 115 14.4 kCi 101 Ci 2.8 1.1× 106
3 years 47.3 5.92 kCi 41 Ci 1.1 4.6× 105
5 years 8.0 1.00 kCi 7.0 Ci 0.19 7.8× 104
10 years 9.5× 10−2 12 Ci 3.1 GBq 2.3× 10−3 9.2× 102
20 years 1.3× 10−5 61 MBq 430 kBq 3.2× 10−7 0.13
40 years 2.5× 10−13 1.2 Bq 8.3 mBq 6.2× 10−15 2.5× 10−9
Table 19: Evolution of the source, starting with an initial β activity of 85 kCi. The dose rate is
calculated with formula 23 at 1 m from the center of the source (∼ 80 cm of the shielding if any).
A Interaction length in Tungsten alloy
In reference [63] we found plots of the cross section for photon on all elements taking from the
evaluated data base ENDF/B-VI. Examples on W, Fe, Ni,U are given in figure 50. These data are
used to precisely compute the interaction length in tungsten alloys.
The total interaction length is 1.238 ± 0.14 cm (see details in table 20). For comparison, the
interaction lengths in pure tungsten and uranium metals are respectively 1.19 cm and 1.13 cm.
For a tungsten alloy shielding having a density of 18.5 ± 0.2 gm/cm3the attenuation factor in a
35 cm thick shielding is (5.25 ± 1.4 ) × 10−13.
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Figure 47: Impact of the KamLAND energy resolution on the sensitivity. We assume a antineutrino
generator located 9.3 m away from the detector center. The sensitivity is computed for 18 months
of data taking. We vary the resolution from 2.5% to 15%, not depending on energy. The left panel
shows the rate+shape sensitivity assuming a normalization uncertainty of 1.5%, whereas the right
panel shows the shape only sensitivity. We observe that the sensitivity is not noticeably degraded
for ∆m2 between 1 to 10 eV2 in the case of the rate+shape analysis. KamLAND published energy
resolution is 5 % at 1 MeV, corresponding conservatively to the black lines on both plots since the
positrons induced from the source have an energy between 1 and 2.3 MeV. The energy resolution is
therefore not an issue for the CeLAND. Exclusion contours are given at the 95% CL for a fiducial
volume is taken as 0<R<6.5 m.
Element E (keV) σ (barn) A Z % in mass # nuclei/cm3 λi
W 2179 13.3 ± 1 183.84 74 97 5.878 1022 1.279 ± 0.096 cm
Fe 2189 5.09 ± .15 55.845 26 1.5 0.299 1022 65.65 ± 0.19 cm
Ni 2188 5.28 ± .15 58.6934 28 1.5 0.284 1022 66.52 ± 1.9 cm
Table 20: Data used for the computation of the attenuation length in tungsten alloy. λi is the
partial interaction length. The total interaction length : 1.238 ± 0.14 cm.
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Figure 48: Impact of the KamLAND vertex resolution on the sensitivity. We assume a antineutrino
generator located 9.3 m away from the detector center. The sensitivity is computed for 18 months
of data taking. We vary the resolution from 5 cm to 25 cm. The left panel shows the rate+shape
sensitivity assuming a normalization uncertainty of 1.5%, whereas the right panel shows the shape
only sensitivity. The KamLAND published vertex resolution is 15 cm, corresponding to the black
lines on all plots. Therefore one expects no concern induced by vertex resolution effect for this
phase of the experiment. Exclusion contours are given at the 95% CL for a fiducial volume is taken
as 0<R<6.5 m.
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Figure 49: Impact on the knowledge of the source activity. We assume a antineutrino generator
located 9.3 m away from the detector center. The sensitivity is computed for 18 months of data
taking. The normalization error is expected to be about 1.5%, dominated by the uncertainty on
the measurement of the absolute activity of the antineutrino generator. Exclusion contours are
given at the 95% CL for a fiducial volume is taken as 0<R<6.5 m.
Figure 50: Cross sections of the interaction of γ′s with tungsten, iron, nickel, and tungsten alloy
(18.5 g/cm3).
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